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Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a), Defendant, Third Party Plaintiff 
and Appellant, Insure-Rite, Inc., (hereinafter "Appellant"), by and through its specially-
appearing counsel of record John Martinez, hereby submits the following Opening Brief: 
LIST OF PARTIES 
The parties to this appeal are identified in the caption herein. 
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JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OVER THIS CASE 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(j)(1996) and Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court erroneously refuse to dismiss Appellee Landlord's eviction action 
by concluding that the landlord's Notice to Quit and Summons were proper under Utah law? 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. No deference to trial court. Ong International 
(U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993); Fowler v. Seiter. 838 
P.2d 675, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
2. Did the trial court erroneously grant Appellee Landlord's motions for summary 
judgment for possession and damages? 
Standard of Review: "Correctness." No deference to trial court. All facts and 
inferences viewed in light most favorable to party against whom summary judgment was 
granted. Brown v. Weis. 871 P.2d 552, 559 (Utah 1994); Atlas Corporation v. The Clovis 
National Bank. 737 P.2d 225,229 (Utah 1987); Wvcalis v. Guardian Title of Utah. 780 P.2d 
821, 824 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). 
3. Did the trial court err in its post-summary judgment rulings refusing to stay the 
enforcement of such summary judgments, granting attorney fees and costs, and dismissing 
Appellant Tenant's counterclaims and third-party complaint? 
1 
Standards of Review: (a) With respect to the trial court's refusal to stay enforcement 
of its rulings on summary judgment, the standard is "abuse of discretion." See UTAH R.CIV.P. 
62(a); Taylor National Inc. v. Jensen Brothers Construction Co., 641 P.2d 150, 154 (Utah 
1982). (b) With respect to the trial court's award of attorney fees and costs, the standard is 
"correctness." No deference is due the trial court. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 9325 936 (Utah 
1994) (errors of law), (c) With respect to the trial court's award of attorneys fees and costs, 
the standard is "clear abuse of discretion." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 
(Utah 1988)(clear abuse of discretion), (d) With respect to the trial court's dismissal of the 
Tenant's counterclaims and third-party complaint, the standard is "correctness." No deference 
is due the trial court. State y. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) (errors of law). 
STATUTES AND RULES WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE 
OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3. Unlawful detainer by tenant for term less than life. 
(1) A tenant of real property, for a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful 
detainer: 
(a) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, of the property 
or any part of it, after the expiration of the specified term or period for which 
it is let to him, which specified temci or period, whether established by express 
or implied contract, or whether written or parol, shall be terminated without 
notice at the expiration of the specified term or period; 
(b) when, having leased real property for an indefinite time with monthly or 
other periodic rent reserved: 
(i) he continues in possession of it in person or by subtenant after the 
end of any month or period, in cases where the owner, his designated 
agent, or any successor in estate of the owner, 15 days or more prior to 
the end of that month or period, has served notice requiring him to quit 
the premises at the expiration of that month or period; or 
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(ii) in cases of tenancies at will where he remains in possession of the 
premises after the expiration of a notice of not less than five days; 
(c) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after default 
in the payment of any rent and after a notice in writing requiring in the 
alternative the payment of the rent or the surrender of the detained premises, 
has remained uncomplied with for a period of three days after service, which 
notice may be served at any time after the rent becomes due; 
(d) when he assigns or sublets the leased premises contrary to the covenants 
of the lease, or commits or permits waste on the premises, or when he sets up 
or carries on any unlawful business on or in the premises, or when he suffers, 
permits, or maintains on or about the premises any nuisance, including 
nuisance as defined in Section 78-38-9, and remains in possession after service 
upon him of a three days' notice to quit; or 
(e) when he continues in possession, in person or by subtenant, after a neglect 
or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement under 
which the property is held, other than those previously mentioned, and after 
notice in writing requiring in the alternative the performance of the conditions 
or covenant or the surrender of the property, served upon him and upon any 
subtenant in actual occupation of the premises remains uncomplied with for 
three days after service. Within three days after the service of the notice, the 
tenant, any subtenant in actual occupation of the premises, any mortgagee of 
the term, or other person interested in its continuance may perform the 
condition or covenant and thereby save the lease from forfeiture, except that 
if the covenants and conditions of the lease violated by the lessee cannot 
afterwards be performed, then no notice need be given. 
(2) Unlawful detainer by an owner resident of a mobile home is determined under 
Title 57, Chapter 16, Mobile Home Park Residency Act. 
(3) The notice provisions for nuisance in Subsection 78-36-3(l)(d) are not applicable 
to nuisance actions provided in Sections 78-38-9 through 78- 38-16 only, (emphasis 
added) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-8. Allegations permitted in complaint 
—Time for appearance 
—Service of summons. 
The plaintiff in his complaint, in addition to setting forth the facts on which he seeks 
to recover, may set forth any circumstances of fraud, force, or violence which may 
have accompanied the alleged forcible entry, or forcible or unlawful detainer, and 
claim damages therefor or compensation for the occupation of the premises, or both. 
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If the unlawful detainer charged is after default in the payment of rent, the complaint 
shall state the amount of rent due. The court shall indorse on the summons the number 
of days within which the defendant is required to appear and defend the action, which 
shall not be less than three or more than 20 days from the date of service. The court 
may authorize service by publication or mail for cause shown. Service by publication 
is complete one week after publication. Service by mail is complete three days after 
mailing. The summons shall be changed in form to conform to the time of service as 
ordered, and shall be served as in other cases, (emphasis added) 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages, and reint 
—Immediate enforcement 
-Treble damages. 
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon default. A judgment entered 
in favor of the plaintiff shall include an order for the restitution of the premises as 
provided in Section 78-36-10.5. If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after 
neglect or failure to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement 
under which the property is held, or after default in the payment of rent, the judgment 
shall also declare the forfeiture of the lease or agreement. 
(2) The jury or the court, if the proceeding is tried without a jury or upon the 
defendant's default, shall also assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from any 
of the following: 
(a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's tenancy, if waste is alleged in 
the complaint and proved at trial; 
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is after default in 
the payment of rent; and 
(e) die abatement of the nuisance by eviction as provided in Sections 78-38-9 
through 78-38-16. 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant for the rent, for three times 
the amount of the damages assessed under Subsections (2Xa) through (2Xc), and for 
reasonable attorneys' fees, if they are provided for in the lease or agreement. 
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after default in the payment of the rent, 
execution upon the judgment shall be issued immediately after the entry of the 
judgment. In all cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced immediately, 
(emphasis added) 
4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is about whether Landlord Parkside Salt Lake Corporation, through bad 
faith conduct, could lawfully prevent Tenant Insure-Rite, Inc. from exercising its Option to 
Extend its lease so that Parkside could evict Insure-Rite and re-let to another tenant to whom 
Parkside had already promised the lease premises. Appellant-Tenant Insure-Rite, Inc. seeks 
relief from the trial court's final judgment and antecedent rulings and orders illegally 
asserting jurisdiction over this case; evicting Appellant from its premises; imposing liability 
upon Appellant for damages, attorneys fees and costs; and dismissing Appellant's 
counterclaims and third party complaint. 
On February 24, 1997, Appellee Parkside Salt Lake Corporation as Landlord, and 
Appellant Insure-Rite, Inc. as Tenant, signed a lease for commercial office space in 
Parkside's 13-story office building located at 215 South State Street in downtown Salt Lake 
City. (R. 10)(relevant lease provisions attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 1) The leased 
premises were a comparatively modest 5,037 square feet, rented at an annual rate of $16.15 
per square foot. (R. 10) The Lease began on May 1, 1997, and was to expire on June 30, 
1998, unless the Tenant exercised its Option to Extend the lease for an additional 3-year term 
upon the same terms and conditions except for the monthly rent. (R. 53) The Tenant's 
"Option to Extend'1 the lease provided: 
"Provided Tenant has not defaulted under this Lease, and that this Lease is in 
full force and effect at the time Tenant exercises the option to extend as 
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provided herein, then Tenant shall have the option (the "Option to Extend") to 
extend the term of this Lease for an additional period of three (3) years (the 
"Extension Term"), upon the same terms and conditions except Basic Rent 
shall be adjusted to the then prevailing market rates, commencing on the day 
after the Expiration Date of the Lease. The Option to Extend must be 
exercised by written notice delivered by Tenant to Landlord at any time prior 
to March 1, 1998. Thirty days after Tenant notifies Landlord it is exercising 
its option, Landlord must provide Tenant with written notice of the new rental. 
"Market rate", as used by Landlord to determine the new Basic Rent shall be 
the rental rate for comparable space of comparable size for a similar term for 
a similar credit-worthy tenant by reference first to the Building and second to 
the other similar buildings in downtown Salt Lake City. Tenant may reject the 
new rental rate for a period of 30 days following notice from the Landlord, at 
which time Tenant's exercise of its Option to Extend shall be null and void. If 
Tenant does not notify Landlord within 30 days of Landlord's notice to Tenant 
of the new rental rate, then Tenant shall automatically be deemed to have 
accepted the market rental rate in the notice." (R. 53)(emphasis added) 
On February 6, 1998, almost a month before the deadline for doing so, the Tenant 
provided the Landlord written notice exercising the Option to Extend the lease for three 
years. (R. 204XAddendum Exhibit 2) On February 10, 1998, instead of communicating a 
proposed "new Basic Rent" computed according to the terms of the Option to Extend, 
Landlord Parkside responded with a proposal for a whole new lease, which violated the 
requirements imposed on the landlord by the Option to Extend because, inter alia, the 
landlord's response: (1) proposed an entirely new lease, rather than setting out the "new 
Basic Rent" for a three-year term extension as expressly required by the Option to Extend; 
(2) contained annual escalations in rent for each year of the three-year extension term, in 
violation of the express terms of the Option to Extend, which provided for the "new Basic 
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Rent" to be locked in at the "then prevailing market rates" as of the date of the extension; (3) 
omitted consideration of the lower comparable rentals in the Landlord's own Parkside Tower 
building in determining the new Basic Rent, as expressly required by the Option to Extend; 
(4) contrary to the express requirement in the Option to Extend that the 3-year extension 
should be "upon the same terms and conditions" as the original lease except for the new 
Basic Rent, the Landlord demanded that the Tenant pay for all of its own parking spaces, 
whereas under the original Lease, the Tenant received 5 free parking spaces, which had a 
value of approximately $10,000 over the 3-year extension; and (5) refused to offer 
comparable relocation premises in the event of nonrenewal, as required by the original lease. 
(R. 206-209)(Addendum Exhibit 3) 
In its February 10, 1998 response, the Landlord also stated: 
"... Landlord reserves the right to issue lease proposals with respect to the 
same premises to any number of parties at any one time and from time to 
time... by Landlord at its sole discretion." (R. 207)(emphasis added) 
In fact, Access Long Distance, a major tenant which rented the 10th floor of Landlord's 
building, had already demanded the rental space occupied by Appellant Tenant, and the 
Landlord preferred to have Access Long Distance occupy the space. (R. 732 ffl[13, 
14)(Kasteler Affidavit attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 4) The Landlord's February 10, 
1998 proposal for a whole new lease, therefore, was carefully crafted as "an offer you can't 
accept," so that Appellant Tenant would reject it and move out. (R. 732, ^ 14). 
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Not to be so easily kicked out, on March 5, 1998, the Tenant re-confirmed its exercise 
of the Option to Extend for three years upon the same terms and conditions as the original 
lease, at a new Basic Rent of $17.00 per square foot, a 5% increase over the original lease 
rent of $16.15 per square foot. (R. 55yAddendum Exhibit 5) In contrast, Landlord in its 
proposal for a new lease had demanded an average of $18.00 per square foot, an 11% 
increase over the original lease rent. (R. 749) 
Landlord Parkside did not otherwise respond within thirty days from February 6, 
1998, the date when Tenant exercised the option, as the Landlord was required to do under 
the Option to Extend. (R. 53) Instead, on March 16, 1998, thirty-eight days after Tenant had 
exercised the Option to Extend, Landlord Parkside responded with a second letter which also 
violated the requirements imposed on the Landlord by the Option to Extend, because the 
Landlord: (1) gave Tenant only four days, until March 20, 1998, to respond, not 30 days as 
required by the Option to Extend; (2) allocated "weights" to the allegedly comparable rentals, 
in order to arrive at a higher proposed new Basic Rent, contrary to the Option to Extend, 
which contained no provision for "weighting" the comparables; (3) continued to insist on 
annual escalations in rent for each year of the 3-year extension term, in violation of the 
express terms of the Option to Extend, which provided for the "new Basic Rent" to be locked 
in at the "then prevailing market rates" as of the date of the extension; (4) demanded an 
average yearly new Basic Rent of $18.00 per square foot, whereas the rental rate in the 
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Landlord's own building, which was the primary "comparable" in the Option to Extend, 
according to Landlord's letter itself was $17.00 per square foot; and (5) still refused to offer 
comparable relocation premises in the event of nonrenewal, as required in the original lease. 
(R. 57-60YAddendum Exhibit 6) 
The Landlord's March 16, 1998 letter further implemented the Landlord's plan to 
provide the Tenant with "an offer you can't accept," because by that time, the Landlord had 
already leased the premises to Access Long Distance. (R. 733, ][18yAddendum Exhibit 4) 
Access Long Distance, under its new name of McLeod USA, presently occupies the premises 
formerly rented by Appellant Tenant. 
By letter dated March 25, 1998, Tenant strenuously objected to the Landlord's 
apparent attempt to constructively evict the Tenant by making it impossible for the Tenant 
to accept the Landlord's response to the Tenant's exercise of the Option to Extend. (R. 62-
64YAddendum Exhibit 7) The Tenant reiterated the inadequacies of the Landlord's February 
10 and March 16 responses. (R. 63-64) In order to assure that Tenant did not reject a 
reasonable "new Basic Rent," however, the Tenant stated that since according to the 
Landlord, the Landlord's other tenants in the building paid $17.00 per square foot, compared 
to the Tenant's original lease rate of $16.15 per square foot, therefore, 
"effective July 1, 1998, and continuously monthly thereafter, Tenant shall pay 
as and for basic rents the sum of $17.00 per square foot for the following 36 
months, and all other terms, provisions, and conditions of the Lease shall be 
and remain in full force and effect." 
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(R. 64)(emphasis added) The Tenant thus did not reject a properly formulated ,fnew Basic 
Rent," but given the Landlord's bad faith responses to the Tenant's exercise of the Option to 
Extend, Tenant instead sought to arrive at a reasonable "new Basic Rent" for the extension 
term. (R. 733, ^fl9)(Addendum Exhibit 4) 
The Tenant paid rent on a timely basis for the months of March, April, May and June 
of 1998 remaining on the original lease, and also tendered payments at the rate of $17.00 per 
square foot for subsequent months, although such subsequent payments were returned by the 
Landlord. (R. 733, ]f20)(Addendum Exhibit 4) Instead, by letter dated April 27, 1998, the 
Landlord through its attorney asserted that "Under the terms of the lease, [the Tenant] must 
accept the market rental rate established by the landlord or rescind its election to extend the 
lease term." (R. 66-67)(Addendum Exhibit 8) The Landlord took the position that "If Insure-
Rite did not agree with the market rate proposed by Parkside its remedy was to find new 
leased space." (R. 758) That, apparently, was what the Landlord intended all along. 
On July 9, 1998, a little over a week after the end of the original lease term, and in 
furtherance of its campaign to kick out the Tenant, Landlord Parkside served Tenant Insure-
Rite, Inc. with a "NOTICE TO QUIT" which did not comply with any of the different types 
of Notices provided by law. (R. 69YAddendum Exhibit 9) The Landlord candidly admitted 
this, explaining that it "was not required to provide Insure-Rite with any notice" and that 
such notice had been provided merely "as a courtesy," because the original lease term had 
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ended. (R. 756) The Landlord thus sought to capitalize on its bad faith in undermining the 
Tenant's attempt to exercise the Option to Extend by pummeling the Tenant with 
unreasonable demands until the original lease term ended, then attempting to treat the Tenant 
as a mere trespasser whose lease had ended, and for which no Notice to Quit is required 
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3(l)(a). (R. 756) 
The Tenant retained a tenant's status, however, and was entitled to a proper Notice 
to Quit, on three independent, alternative grounds. First, under the express terms of the 
original lease, and totally independently of the Option to Extend, the Tenant's holding over 
after the expiration of the original lease term converted the relationship into a month-to-
month, periodic tenancy: 
"SECTION 22. HOLDING OVER 
Should Tenant, with or without Landlord's written consent, hold over after the 
expiration of this Lease, Tenant shall pay, in advance, monthly rent at the rate 
of two hundred percent (200%) of one month's Basic Annual Rent, plus all 
Additional Rent provided by this Lease." (R. 34)(emphasis added) 
The Landlord admitted that Insure-Rite, Inc. was still its tenant by billing Insure-Rite, 
Inc. under Section 22 of the lease for twice the $16.15-per-square-foot original monthly rent 
as "holdover rent". (R. 1477, p.9, lines 5-17)(hearing transcript excerpts attached hereto as 
Addendum Exhibit 10) The Tenant, contending that the lease had been extended for a 3-year 
term under the Option, instead tendered monthly rent at the rate of $17.00 per-square-foot, 
but the Landlord refused such rent. (R. 733, H20)(Addendum Exhibit 4) Since the Tenant 
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became a month-to-month tenant under the lease, and since the underpayment constituted 
a "default in the payment of rent," the Landlord not only was required to provide the Tenant 
a 3-day Notice to Quit, but such Notice also had to require "in the alternative the payment 
of the [additional] rent or the surrender of the detained premises" under UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-36-3(l)(c). The landlord's Notice to Quit did not comply. (R. 69) 
Insure-Rite, Inc. retained a tenant's status under a second independent ground. The 
express terms of the Option to Extend made provision for the circumstances that indeed 
arose. The Option to Extend expressly provided that if the Tenant did not "notify" the 
Landlord in response to the Landlord's (albeit defectively formulated) proposed new Basic 
Rent, the lease extension occurred automatically for a 3-year term at the new rental rate 
propounded by the Landlord: 
"If Tenant does not notify Landlord within 30 days of Landlord's notice to 
Tenant of the new rental rate, then Tenant shall automatically be deemed to 
have accepted the market rental rate in the notice." (R. 53)(emphasis added) 
Indeed, the Tenant never did accept nor reject the Landlord's propounded rate, but instead 
strenuously objected that the Landlord's responses were wholly out of compliance with the 
Landlord's obligations under the Option to Extend. (R. 55; 62-64YAddendum Exhibits 5 & 
7) Under these circumstances, the Option to Extend therefore provided that the Landlord was 
entitled to the approximately $18.00 -per-square-foot rent proposed by the Landlord rather 
than the $17.00 per-square-foot which Tenant in fact tendered. Since the Tenant thereby 
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became a tenant for a term of 3 years, but because the underpayment constituted a "default 
in the payment of rent/1 under this alternative ground as well, the Landlord not only was 
required to provide the Tenant a 3-day Notice to Quit, but such Notice also had to require 
"in the alternative [for] the payment of the [additional] rent or the surrender of the detained 
premises" under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3(l)(c). The landlord's Notice to Quit did not do 
so. (R. 69) 
The Tenant retained a tenant's status under a third independent ground, whereby the 
Landlord cannot be rewarded for unconscionable behavior aimed at preventing the Tenant 
from extending the lease pursuant to the Option to Extend. Under these circumstances, the 
nature of the relationship between Parkside and Insure-Rite, Inc. after the expiration of the 
original lease term, for purposes of a Notice to Quit, is determined from the particular facts 
giving rise to the controversy in order to arrive "at what is fair and reasonable in adjustment 
of the rights of the parties." Thomas J. Peck & Sons. Inc.. 30 Utah 2d 187, 193, 515 P.2d 
446, 449 (1973). At minimum, the lease was extended by operation of law on a month-to-
month basis, and the Tenant's provision of the $17.00 per-square-foot rent was reasonable 
under the circumstances. The Landlord thus was required to provide Tenant with a 15-day 
Notice to Quit under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3(l)(b)(i) in order to terminate such resulting 
periodic tenancy. Alternatively, Insure-Rite, Inc. became a "tenant at will," and the Landlord 
was required to provide a 5-day Notice to Quit under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3(l)(b)(ii). 
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The landlord's 3-day Notice to Quit did not comply with either section. (R. 69) 
Instead, on July 15, 1998, a mere six days after serving its ,fnon-Notice to Quit," 
Landlord Parkside pressed its offensive to kick out the Tenant by filing a Complaint for 
Unlawful Detainer. (R. 1-5) Closely on the heels of such filing, on July 20, 1998, upon Ex 
Parte Motion, Landlord Parkside obtained from the trial court an "Order Shortening Time 
to Answer Complaint" from twenty (20) to seven (7) days. (R. 76-77) The Landlord served 
the Tenant the following day, on July 21, 1998, but voluntarily withdrew such service when 
confronted with the Tenant's challenge to the defective Summons. (R. 92-97) On July 27, 
1998, the Landlord tried again, serving the Tenant with a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer 
(R. 1-73), the Order Shortening Time to Answer Complaint (R. 76-77), and a second 
Summons. (R. 89-9 lYAddendum Exhibit 11) 
Significantly, the trial court did not "indorse on the summons the number of days 
within which the defendant [was] required to appear and defend the action" as required by 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-8. (R. 105-106) On August 3, 1998, responding to the Landlord's 
onslaught, Tenant Insure-Rite, Inc. appeared specially and filed a Motion to Quash the 
Summons Served on July 27, 1998 on that ground. (R. 98-99) Pressing its attack, however, 
on August 19, 1998 Landlord Parkside filed its first motion for partial summary judgment, 
seeking eviction of the Tenant. (R. 137-139) 
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At a HEARING on October 26, 1998, the trial court: (1) summarily denied Tenant 
Insure-Rite's Motion to Quash the Summons Served on July 27, 1998 and (2) postponed 
consideration of the Landlord's motion for summary judgment in order to give the Tenant 
time to file opposing memoranda. (R. 1045, p. 16, lines 16-19)(hearing transcript excerpts 
attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 12) 
Over a three-day period, the Tenant quickly marshaled its forces against the 
Landlord's vicious attack. On November 9, 1998, the Tenant appeared specially once more 
and filed a Motion to Dismiss the Landlord's complaint on three alternative grounds: (1) 
Insufficiency of Process, for lack of a properly indorsed Summons; (2) Lack of Personal 
Jurisdiction, for lack of a properly indorsed Summons; and (3) Failure to State a Claim for 
Which Relief Can be Granted, for failure to serve a proper Notice to Quit. (R. 554-557) The 
following day, November 10, 1998, Tenant Insure-Rite, Inc. further appeared specially and 
filed an Answer, Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint. (R. 612-707) The day after that, 
on November 11, 1998, Tenant Insure-Rite, Inc. appeared specially once more and filed its 
Opposition to the landlord's motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the issue 
of possession. (R. 708-752) In that Opposition, the Tenant also renewed its objection to the 
deficient Notice to Quit as the threshold basis for urging denial of the Landlord's motion for 
summary judgment. (R. 719-721) 
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At a HEARING on November 13, 1998, however, the trial court through oral rulings 
summarily precluded further consideration of the Tenant's Motion to Dismiss the Landlord's 
complaint, including the Tenant's contention that the Landlord's Notice to Quit was 
inadequate under Utah law: (a) by granting the landlord's motion for partial summary 
judgment and evicting the Tenant; and (b) by stating, "Your client received the proper 
summons. That is my ruling on that. That was my ruling before." (R. 1041, p. 17, lines 2-
4)(hearing transcript excerpts attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 13) On the same day, 
the trial court also signed a written ORDER denying the Tenant's earlier Motion to Quash 
the Landlord's July 27, 1998 Summons. (R. 761-763) On November 30, 1998, the trial court 
signed a written ORDER granting the landlord's motion for partial summary judgment and 
evicting the Tenant. (R. 796-798) The Tenant vacated the premises on December 6, 1998. 
(R.8l2,p.3,1}5) 
In addition to the trial court's errors in refusing to dismiss the Landlord's action for 
failure to provide a proper Notice to Quit and a properly indorsed Summons, the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment for possession to the landlord erred by deciding, genuinely 
disputed issues of fact. As the trial court candidly admitted at the November 13, 1998 
hearing, it recognized that there were disputed genuine issues of fact: 
"I mean, there are very few issues of fact here, obviously." 
(R. 1037, p.2, lines 22-23)(Addendum Exhibit 13Xemphasis added) 
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The trial court recognized that there was a genuine issue of fact regarding the procedure 
which the Landlord was to follow, when the trial court asked counsel for the Landlord: 
"Well, tell me before you step down, in that case, what does the language 
[f]comparable size, similar terms, similar credit worthy tenant, first by 
reference to the building, second to the other similar buildings in Downtown 
Salt Lake,[f] what does that suppose to mean if you can't use it to see whether 
or not the market rate is fair?" [sic] 
(R. 1037, p.3, lines 16-22YAddendum Exhibit 13Xemphasis added) 
The trial court also recognized that there was a genuine issue of fact regarding the scope of 
the landlord's discretion in setting the new Basic Rent, the avenues open to the tenant once 
the Landlord responded, and whether the Landlord's responses were in good faith. Instead, 
the trial court decided these disputed genuine issues of material fact: 
"THE COURT:... I'm granting the motion for partial summary judgment. The 
reason is this phrase, sentence, which I think is the key to the whole case and 
the renewal of an option, which is 'Market rate as used by landlord to 
determine the new basic rent shall be the rental rate.' The reason this is not a 
formula which can result in an exact calculation no matter what an appraiser 
says or anybody else - had it specifically identified buildings, specific 
buildings, specific floors, specific configurations or minimum and maximum 
square footage, maybe we could get there. But my ruling is what this does is 
about what [Landlord's counsel] said it does, that is it requires fairness. 
Somebody couldn't - the landlord couldn't have said 30 bucks, the same way 
the tenant couldn't have come back with two bucks. It says there's got to be a 
fair market price. We are talking about a range. There is no question in my 
mind but that $18 falls within the fair range that we are talking about. ..." 
(R. 1040-1041, p. 15, lines 10-25; p. 16, lines 1-12XAddendum Exhibit 13yemphasis added) 
The trial court on summary judgment thus improperly decided these disputed issues 
of fact which, as the court itself acknowledged, were "the key" to the whole case. Most 
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profoundly, the parties disagreed about what the "new Basic Rent" should be: the Landlord 
in its February 10, 1998 and March 16, 1998 letters demanded, inter alia, $18.00 per square 
foot, an 11% increase over the original lease rate, whereas the Tenant's expert contended it 
should be $17.00, a 5% increase. (R. 749) The trial court improperly decided that 
fundamental disputed genuine issue of material fact as well: "There is no question in my 
mind but that $18 falls within the fair range that we are talking about." (R. 1041, p. 16, lines 
3 -4XAddendum Exhibit 13)(emphasis added) 
The Tenant unsuccessfully sought both Interlocutory Review and Appeal as of Right 
from the trial court's rulings. On January 20, 1999, however, the Utah Supreme Court 
dismissed without prejudice Tenant's appeal as of right from the November 30, 1998 trial 
court ORDER, (R. 985) and on January 27, 1999, the Utah Supreme Court similarly denied 
Tenant's Petition for Permission to Appeal the November 30, 1998 trial court ORDER by 
way of Interlocutory Review. (R. 987) 
On March 26, 1999, the trial court entered a written ORDER granting Landlord 
Parkside's motion for partial summary judgment regarding damages, and trebled the amount 
to $108,417.24. (R. 1184-1185) Almost immediately, and without allowing the Tenant an 
opportunity to pay such amount, the Landlord on March 30, 1999, recorded ]is pendens 
against the homes of both of the sureties on the tenant's possession bond. (R. 1237-1244) 
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On April 27, 1999, the trial court entered a written ORDER denying the Tenant's 
Motion to Stay Enforcement of the Judgment. (R. 1282-1283) On June 4, 1999, the landlord 
acknowledged the Tenant's payment of the $108,417.24 judgment. (R. 1289-1291) But on 
June 30, 1999, the landlord nevertheless obtained a Writ of Garnishment in the amount of 
$14,500.00 against the Tenant's checking account. (R. 1301-1304) 
On July 27, 1999, the trial court entered a written ORDER awarding $33,823.50 in 
attorneys fees and costs to Landlord Parkside. (R. 1323-1324) On July 30, 1999, the 
Landlord acknowledged the Tenant's payment of interest on the $108,417.24 judgment. (R. 
1327-1329) And on August 30, 1999, the landlord further acknowledged the tenant's payment 
of $33,823.50 in attorneys fees and costs to the landlord. (R. 1362-1364) 
On November 2, 1999, the trial court entered a written ORDER granting a motion by 
Landlord Parkside, and Third Party Defendants Collins and Wallace & Associates, entitled 
"Motion to Dismiss/or Alternatively for Judgment on the Pleadings, and Wallace & 
Associates' and Collin Perkins' Motion to Dismiss." (R. 1368-1369) The trial court 
considered its earlier rulings on summary judgment to have disposed entirely of the Tenant's 
counterclaims and third party complaint. (R. 1480, Trial Court Hearing Transcript, October 
1, 1999 hearing, p.2, lines 17-18: "THE COURT: Oh, I remember. I've already granted 
summary judgment on your claims.") 
19 
In its second attempt to obtain appellate review of the trial court's rulings, on 
November 4, 1999, the Tenant filed its second Notice of Appeal. (R. 1370-1372) On 
January 11, 2000, however, the Utah Supreme Court in Promax Development Corp. v. Raile. 
998 P.2d 254 (Utah 2000) overruled prior Utah Court of Appeal authority and held that cases 
in which additional attorneys' fees claims are pending are not "final" for purposes of appeal. 
On March 14, 2000, upon Tenant's request in light of the Promax decision, the Court of 
Appeals, to which the case had been poured over, dismissed the Tenant's appeal without 
prejudice. (R. 1437-1437A) 
On June 21, 2000, Landlord Parkside filed its "Fifth Partial Satisfaction of Judgment" 
acknowledging that the Tenant had paid all attorney fees and costs as ordered by the trial 
court. (R. 1459-1461) On June 28, 2000, the trial court entered its "Order for Entry of Final 
Judgment Pursuant to Stipulation" in accordance with the Stipulation of the parties. (R. 
1462-1464) Finally, on its present, third, attempt to obtain appellate review, the Tenant filed 
its Notice of Appeal for this matter on June 29, 2000. (R. 1465-1467) 
20 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case is about whether Landlord Parkside Salt Lake Corporation, through bad 
faith conduct, could lawfully prevent Tenant Insure-Rite, Inc. from exercising its Option to 
Extend its lease so that Parkside could evict Insure-Rite and re-let to another tenant to whom 
Parkside had already promised the lease premises. 
The legal issues fall into three major categories: First, as a threshold matter, the trial 
court should have dismissed the Landlord's action because both the Notice to Quit as well 
as the Summons used by the Landlord were statutorily insufficient. The Notice to Quit was 
mandatory because the Tenant was not reduced to a mere trespasser by the Landlord's tactics 
aimed at obstructing the Tenant's exercise of the Option to Extend the lease. And, the Notice 
to Quit used by the Landlord did not comply with the requirements for any of the types of 
Notices to Quit allowed by Utah's Unlawful Detainer statute. The Summons used by the 
Landlord was inadequate because it was neither indorsed nor changed in form by the Court, 
as required by statute. Since the Notice to Quit was inadequate, the trial court should have 
dismissed the Landlord's action for failure to state a claim. Since the Summons also was 
inadequate, the trial court should have quashed the summons and dismissed the Landlord's 
action for lack of personal jurisdiction over the Tenant. The Tenant through special 
appearances throughout this litigation repeatedly has raised these threshold defects, but to 
no avail. 
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The second major category of legal issues arose because the trial court nevertheless 
assumed jurisdiction over the case and granted the Landlord's motion for summary judgment 
for possession, as well as a second motion for summary judgment for damages. Each 
summary judgment was improper because it included the threshold defects in the Notice to 
Quit and the Summons. Moreover, in each summary judgment ruling, the trial court erred by 
adjudicating genuine issues of material fact. In addition, in the summary judgment for 
damages, the trial court erred by trebling the damages involved, since the Tenant was never 
in unlawful detainer, as required by statute for trebling of damages. 
The third major category of legal issues arose in three areas of post-summary 
judgment rulings by the trial court. First, the court abused its discretion because it refused 
to stay enforcement of its rulings on summary judgment. Second, in light of the errors in the 
underlying summary judgments upon which such fees and costs were based, the court further 
erred in granting attorneys fees and costs to the Landlord, and the trial court compounded 
such error by failing to make findings regarding the reasonableness of such fees and costs. 
Third, the trial court also erred in dismissing the Tenant's counterclaims and third-party 




BOTH THE NOTICE TO QUIT AND THE SUMMONS SERVED ON 
THE TENANT BY THE LANDLORD WERE STATUTORILY 
INSUFFICIENT, DEPRIVING THE TRIAL COURT OF 
JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE LANDLORD'S EVICTION ACTION1 
A. The Landlord did not provide an appropriate Notice to Quit, hence the Tenant 
was not in "unlawful detainer1 f under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3(1), so the trial 
court erred by not dismissing the Landlord's action 
An "unlawful detainer" action is a statutory proceeding whereby a landlord can 
summarily regain possession from a tenant who is "guilty of an unlawful detainer". UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-36-3. It is a severe remedy, in derogation of the common law, so the 
requirements for an Unlawful Detainer Action must be strictly complied with before such 
an action may be brought. Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852, 853 (Utah 1979). 
How a tenant becomes "guilty of an unlawful detainer" depends on the type of 
tenancy involved, which in turn is defined by the lease between the parties and the 
circumstances surrounding their relationship. In the ordinary case, a tenancy for a specified 
l
. The Tenant raised the insufficiency of the Notice to Quit and the Summons by 
special appearance at every opportunity. In particular, the trial court denied the Tenant's 
Motion to Quash the Summons Served on July 27, 1998, Motion to Dismiss the 
Landlord's Complaint, and Oppositions to the Landlord's Motions for Summary 
Judgment, in which the Tenant raised these objections. The standard of review for these 
threshold issues on appeal is the "correction of error" standard, for which no deference is 
due the trial court. Ong International (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 
455 (Utah 1993); Fowler v. Seiter. 838 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
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term ends of its own accord and the tenant is "guilty of an unlawful detainer" without notice 
at the expiration of the term. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3(l)(a). In all other tenancies, 
however, a proper Notice to Quit must be served on a tenant in order to "place the tenant in 
unlawful detainer." Sovereen v. Meadows. 595 P.2d 852, 854 (Utah 1979). 
1. The Landlord was required to provide a Notice to Quit 
Landlord Parkside contends that it was not required to provide any Notice to Quit at 
all because its Unlawful Detainer Action was begun after the end of the original term of the 
lease. (R. 756) Under three independent grounds, however, the Tenant retained a tenant's 
status and was entitled to a proper Notice to Quit. Since the Landlord failed to provide a 
proper Notice, the Tenant was never in unlawful detainer. 
First, under the express terms of the original lease, independently of the Option to 
Extend, the Tenanfs holding over after the expiration of the original lease term converted the 
relationship into a month-to-month, periodic tenancy: 
"SECTION 22. HOLDING OVER 
Should Tenant, with or without Landlord's written consent, hold over after the 
expiration of this Lease, Tenant shall pay, in advance, monthly rent at the rate 
of two hundred percent (200%) of one month's Basic Annual Rent, plus all 
Additional Rent provided by this Lease." 
(R. 34, p.25, § 22)(Addendum Exhibit lXemphasis added) 
The Landlord admitted that Insure-Rite, Inc. was still its tenant by billing Insure-Rite, 
Inc. for "holdover rent" determined under this section in the lease. (R. 1477, p.9, lines 5-
17)(hearing transcript excerpts attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 10) Thus, the Landlord 
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demanded twice the $16.15-per-square-foot original monthly rent. Contending that the lease 
had been extended for a 3-year term under the Option, the Tenant instead tendered monthly 
rent at the rate of $17.00 per-square-foot, but the Landlord returned such payments. (R. 733, 
f^20)(Addendum Exhibit 4) Since the Tenant thereby became a month-to-month tenant, and 
since the underpayment constituted a "default in the payment of rent," the Landlord not only 
was required to provide the Tenant a 3-day Notice to Quit, but such Notice also had to 
require "in the alternative the payment of the [additional] rent or the surrender of the 
detained premises." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3(l)(c)(3-day Notice to Quit required, 
providing in the alternative for the payment of rent or surrender of the premises); Cache 
County v. Beus. 978 P.2d 1043, 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)(3-day Notice to Quit without 
"remedy or quit" provision is statutorily defective); see also Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 
852, 853-54 (Utah 1979)(unconditional notice to quit served on month-to-month tenant is 
insufficient to place tenant in unlawful detainer). Landlord Parkside's Notice to Quit 
similarly did not comply. (R. 69)2 
Insure-Rite, Inc. retained a tenant's status under a second independent ground. The 
express terms of the Option to Extend provided for the circumstances that indeed arose. The 
Option to Extend expressly set out that if the Tenant did not "notify" the Landlord in 
2
. Notably, if the Tenant thereafter had brought the rent current, the Landlord still 
could have terminated such month-to-month tenancy with a 15-day Notice to Quit under 
Utah Code Ann. §78-36-3(l)(b)(i). The Landlord herein, however, served only a 3-day 
Notice to Quit. 
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response to the Landlord's (albeit defectively formulated) proposed new Basic Rent, the lease 
extension occurred automatically for a 3-year term at the new rental rate propounded by the 
Landlord: 
"If Tenant does not notify Landlord within 30 days of Landlord's notice to 
Tenant of the new rental rate, then Tenant shall automatically be deemed to 
have accepted the market rental rate in the notice." (R. 53)(emphasis added) 
Indeed, the Tenant neither accepted nor rejected the Landlord's propounded rate, but instead 
strenuously objected that the Landlord's responses were wholly out of compliance with the 
Landlord's obligations under the Option to Extend. (R. 55; 62-64YAddendum Exhibits 5 & 
7) The Option to Extend provided that under those circumstances, the Landlord was entitled 
to the approximately $18.00 -per-square-foot rent proposed by the Landlord, rather than the 
$17.00 per-square-foot which the Tenant tendered. The Tenant thereby became a tenant for 
a term of 3 years. Since the underpayment constituted a "default in the payment of rent," 
however, the Landlord was required to provide the Tenant a 3-day Notice to Quit that also 
included "in the alternative [for] the payment of the [additional] rent or the surrender of the 
^ detained premises." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3(l)(c); Cache County v. Beus, 978 P.2d 
1043, 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)(3-day Notice to Quit for nonpayment of rent must provide 
for alternative of payment of rent); see also Jacobsen v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 68, 278 P.2d 
294, 301 (1954)(unconditional notice to quit served on term tenant is insufficient to place 
the tenant in unlawful detainer). The Landlord's Notice to Quit failed to do so. (R. 69) 
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Under a third independent ground, the Tenant retained a tenant's status, was entitled 
to and was not provided a proper Notice to Quit, and therefore was not in unlawful detainer. 
The equitable concept of unconscionability applies in the landlord-tenant setting. Wade v. 
Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1016-17 (Utah 1991). In performing its obligations under the Option 
to Extend, the Landlord had an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Resource 
Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1037 (Utah 
1985). In Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., 706 P.2d at 1041-
42, the Court explained that "procedural unconscionability" focuses on the manner of 
behavior, and "substantive unconscionability" focuses on the content of the terms involved. 
Landlord Parkside engaged in both "procedural" and "substantive" unconscionability, in 
violation of its obligations of good faith and fair dealing. The starting point is the "Option 
to Extend" the lease, which provided: 
"Provided Tenant has not defaulted under this Lease, and that this Lease is in 
full force and effect at the time Tenant exercises the option to extend as 
provided herein, then Tenant shall have the option (the "Option to Extend") to 
extend the term of this Lease for an additional period of three (3) years (the 
"Extension Term"), upon the same terms and conditions except Basic Rent 
shall be adjusted to the then prevailing market rates, commencing on the day 
after the Expiration Date of the Lease. The Option to Extend must be 
exercised by written notice delivered by Tenant to Landlord at any time prior 
to March 1, 1998. Thirty days after Tenant notifies Landlord it is exercising 
its option, Landlord must provide Tenant with written notice of the new rental. 
"Market rate", as used by Landlord to determine the new Basic Rent shall be 
the rental rate for comparable space of comparable size for a similar term for 
a similar credit-worthy tenant by reference first to the Building and second to 
the other similar buildings in downtown Salt Lake City. Tenant may reject the 
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new rental rate for a period of 30 days following notice from the Landlord, at 
which time Tenant's exercise of its Option to Extend shall be null and void. If 
Tenant does not notify Landlord within 30 days of Landlord's notice to Tenant 
of the new rental rate, then Tenant shall automatically be deemed to have 
accepted the market rental rate in the notice." (R. 53)(emphasis added) 
On February 6, 1998, the Tenant properly provided the Landlord with written notice 
exercising the Option to Extend the lease. (R. 204) On February 10, 1998, however, instead 
of communicating a proposed "new Basic Rent" computed according to the terms of the 
Option to Extend, Landlord Parkside responded with a proposal for a whole new lease, 
which violated the terms of the Option to Extend and the Landlord's obligation to act in good 
faith, because the Landlord's response: (1) proposed an entirely new lease, rather than setting 
out the "new Basic Rent" for a three-year term extension; (2) contained annual escalations 
in rent for each year of the 3-year extension term, contrary to the Option to Extend, which 
provided that the "new Basic Rent" would be locked in at the "then prevailing market rates" 
as of the date of the extension; (3) omitted consideration of the lower comparable rentals in 
the Landlord's own Parkside Tower building in determining the new Basic Rent, as expressly 
required by the Option to Extend; (4) contrary to the express requirement in the Option to 
Extend that the extension should be "upon the same terms and conditions" as the original 
lease except for the new Basic Rent, the Landlord demanded that the Tenant pay for all of 
its own parking spaces, whereas under the original Lease, the Tenant received 5 free parking 
spaces, which had a value of approximately $10,000 over the 3-year extension; and (5) 
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refused to offer comparable relocation premises in the event of nonrenewal, as required by 
the original lease. (R.206-209) 
In its February 10, 1998 response Landlord Parkside also stated: 
"... Landlord reserves the right to issue lease proposals with respect to the 
same premises to any number of parties at any one time and from time to 
time... by Landlord at its sole discretion." (R. 207)(emphasis added) 
In fact, Access Long Distance, a major tenant which rented the 10th floor of Landlord's 
building, had already demanded the rental space occupied by Appellant Tenant, and the 
Landlord preferred to have Access Long Distance occupy the space. (R. 732 ffi[13, 
14)(Kasteler Affidavit attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 4) The Landlord's February 10, 
1998 proposal for a whole new lease, therefore, was carefully crafted as "an offer you can't 
accept," so that Appellant Tenant would reject it and move out. (R. 732, f^ 14). 
On March 5, 1998, the Tenant re-confirmed its exercise of the Option to Extend for 
three years upon the same terms and conditions as the original lease, at a new Basic Rent of 
$17.00 per square foot, a 5% increase over the original lease rent of $16.15 per square foot. 
(R. 55XAddendum Exhibit 5) In contrast, Landlord in its new lease proposal had demanded 
an average of $18.00 per square foot, an 11% increase over the original lease rent. (R. 749) 
Landlord Parkside did not otherwise respond within thirty days from February 6, 
1998, the date when Tenant exercised the option, as the landlord was required to do under 
the Option to Extend. (R. 53) Instead, on March 16, 1998, thirty-eight days after Tenant had 
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exercised the Option to Extend, Landlord Parkside responded with a second letter which also 
violated the requirements imposed on the landlord by the Option to Extend, because the 
Landlord: (1) gave Tenant only four days, until March 20, 1998, to respond, not 30 days as 
required by the Option to Extend; (2) allocated "weights" to the allegedly comparable rentals, 
in order to conveniently arrive at a higher proposed new Basic Rent, contrary to the Option 
to Extend, which contained no provision for "weighting" the comparables; (3) continued to 
insist on annual escalations in rent for each year of the 3-year extension term, in violation 
of the express terms of the Option to Extend, which provided for the "new Basic Rent" to be 
locked in at the "then prevailing market rates" as of the date of the extension; (4) demanded 
an average yearly new Basic Rent of $18.00 per square foot, whereas the rental rate in the 
Landlord's own building, (the primary "comparable" expressly required to be used by the 
Option to Extend), according to Landlord's letter itself, was $17.00 per square foot; and (5) 
still refused to offer comparable relocation premises in the event of nonrenewal, as required 
in the original Lease. (R. 57-60) 
The Landlord's March 16, 1998 letter implemented the Landlord's plan to provide the 
Tenant with "an offer you can't accept," because by that time, the Landlord had already 
leased the premises to Access Long Distance. (R. 733, TJ18YAddendum Exhibit 4) Access 
Long Distance, under its new name of McLeod USA, presently occupies the premises 
formerly rented by Appellant Tenant. 
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By letter dated March 25, 1998, Tenant strenuously objected to the Landlord's 
apparent attempt to make it impossible for the Tenant to exercise of the Option to Extend. 
(R. 62-64VAddendum Exhibit 7) The Tenant reiterated the inadequacies of the Landlord's 
February 10 and March 16 responses. (R. 63-64) In order to assure that Tenant did not reject 
a reasonable "new Basic Rent," however, the Tenant stated that since according to the 
Landlord, the Landlord's other tenants in the building paid $17.00 per square foot, compared 
to the Tenant's original lease rate of $16.15 per square foot, therefore, 
"effective July 1, 1998, and continuously monthly thereafter, Tenant shall pay 
as and for basic rents the sum of $17.00 per square foot for the following 36 
months, and all other terms, provisions, and conditions of the Lease shall be 
and remain in full force and effect." (R. 64)(emphasis added) 
The Tenant thus did not reject a properly formulated "new Basic Rent," but given the 
Landlord's bad faith responses to the Tenant's exercise of the Option to Extend, Tenant 
instead sought to arrive at a reasonable "new Basic Rent" for the extension term. (R. 733, 
H19YAddendum Exhibit 4) 
The Tenant paid rent on a timely basis for the months of March, April, May and June 
of 1998 remaining on the original lease, and also tendered payments at the rate of $17.00 per 
square foot for subsequent months, although such subsequent payments were returned by the 
Landlord. (R. 733, ^20YAddendum Exhibit 4) Instead, by letter dated April 27, 1998, the 
Landlord asserted that "Under the terms of the lease, [the Tenant] must accept the market 
rental rate established by the landlord or rescind its election to extend the lease term." (R. 
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66-67)(Addendum Exhibit 8) The Landlord took the position that "If Insure-FLite did not 
agree with the market rate proposed by Parkside its remedy was to find new leased space." 
(R. 758) That, apparently, was what the Landlord intended all along. 
Landlord Appellee Parkside should not be allowed to profit from its malfeasance. 
Since Insure-Rite, Inc. was in lawful possession when it exercised the Option to Extend, it 
"cannot justly be treated as a trespasser." Thomas J. Peck & Sons, Inc. v. Lee Rock Products, 
Inc., 30 Utah 2d 187, 192, 515 P.2d 446, 449 (1973)(occupant in possession pursuant to an 
invalid lease is not a trespasser). The terms of the relationship between Parkside and Insure-
Rite, Inc. after the expiration of the original lease term, for purposes of a Notice to Quit, are 
determined from the particular facts giving rise to the controversy to arrive "at what is fair 
and reasonable in adjustment of the rights of the parties." Thomas J. Peck & S ons. Inc. v. 
Lee Rock Products, Inc., 30 Utah 2d at 193, 515 P.2d at 449 (implying a year-to-year lease 
because invalid proposed lease was on a yearly basis for five years with option to renew). 
Thus, under this third alternative ground, reflecting the parties1 month-to-month 
Holdover Tenant provision, the lease between Parkside and Insure-Rite, Inc., at minimum, 
was extended by operation of law on a month-to-month periodic basis. (R. 34) The Tenant's 
provision of the $17.00 per-square-foot rent was reasonable under such circumstances, since 
that was the average rate in the Landlord's own building, and also since the Landlord 
ultimately accepted the $17.00 rate as damages. (R. 1477, p.15, lines 5-13)(hearing transcript 
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excerpts attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 10) The Landlord therefore was required to 
provide Tenant with a 15-day Notice to Quit under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3(l)(b)(i) in 
order to terminate such resulting month-to-month tenancy. Alternatively, Insure-Rite, Inc. 
became a "tenant at will," and Landlord Parkside was required to provide a 5-day Notice to 
Quit under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3(l)(b)(ii). The landlord's 3-day Notice to Quit was 
insufficient under either section. (R. 69) 
2. Since the Landlord's Notice to Quit did not satisfy the requirements of any 
of the types of Notices to Quit provided by statute, the trial court should 
have dismissed the Landlord's action 
The Notice to Quit served by the Landlord herein was merely a 3-day notice, and also 
did not provide for the alternative of payment of overdue rent. (R. 69) Such notice did not 
satisfy the requirements of any of the Notices to Quit provided for in the Unlawful Detainer 
statute. Where a tenancy has not been terminated by a proper Notice to Quit, a court must 
dismiss the landlord's Unlawful Detainer suit on the ground that there is no cause of action. 
Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852, 854 (Utah 1979) quoting Carstensen v. Hansen, 107 
Utah 234, 237, 152 P.2d 954, 956 (1944)(Wolfe, C.J, concurring). Tenant Appellant Insure-
Rite, Inc. appeared specially below and moved to dismiss the action for failure to state a 
claim pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (R. 554-557) The Tenant repeated 
its objection on this ground through subsequent Oppositions to the landlord's motions for 
summary judgment, all to no avail. (R. 708-752; 918-963 ) 
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The trial court should have dismissed the Landlord's action for failure to state a claim. 
Accordingly, the judgment and all other rulings below should be reversed. 
B. The Summons served upon the Tenant by the Landlord was not "indorsed" or 
"changed in form" by the trial court as required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-8, 
so the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Tenant 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-8 provides that in Unlawful Detainer actions: 
,f
... The court shall indorse on the summons the number of days within which 
the defendant is required to appear and defend the action, which shall not be 
less than three or more than 20 days from the date of service. . . . The 
summons shall be changed in form to conform to the time of service as 
ordered, and shall be served as in other cases." (Emphasis added) 
On July 20, 1998, upon Ex Parte Motion, Landlord Parkside obtained from the trial 
court an "Order Shortening Time to Answer Complaint" from twenty (20) to seven (7) days. 
(R. 76-77) The Landlord served the Tenant the following day, on July 21, 1998, but 
voluntarily withdrew such service when confronted with the Tenant's challenge to the 
defective Summons. (R. 92-97) On July 27, 1998, the Landlord tried again, serving the 
Tenant with a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer (R. 1-73), the Order Shortening Time to 
Answer Complaint (R. 76-77), and a second Summons. (R. 89-91)(Addendum Exhibit 11) 
The trial court did not "indorse on the summons the number of days within which the 
defendant [was] required to appear and defend the action," nor did the trial court change the 
Summons "to conform to the time of service as ordered," as required by UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-36-8. (R. 89-91) A court lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant if the summons 
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served on the defendant does not contain a statutorily required indorsement. Fowler v. Seiten 
838 P.2d 675, 678 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)(UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-8 requires that summons 
in unlawful detainer action must be indorsed by the court); cf. Dynapac, Inc. v. Innovations, 
Inc., 550 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1976)(process servers failure to indorse date and time of 
service rendered summons "fatally defective"; court obtained no personal jurisdiction over 
defendant). The tenant by special appearance at its first opportunity, and subsequently by 
similar special appearances, raised the defense of failure to obtain the court's indorsement 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8: (1) the Tenant appeared specially and moved to quash the 
summons for insufficiency of process pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4) (R. 
98-99); (2) the Tenant appeared specially and moved to dismiss the action for Insufficiency 
of Process under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4) and for lack of jurisdiction over the 
person under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) (R. 554-557); and (3) the Tenant 
appeared specially and renewed this objection in its Opposition to the Landlord's Motions 
for Summary Judgment. (R. 708-752; 918-963) The trial court in each instance, however, 
erroneously refused to dismiss the Landlord's action. 
The Landlord cannot successfully contend that the separate "Order Shortening Time 
to Answer Complaint" which the Landlord obtained on ex parte motion to the trial court prior 
to commencement of the unlawful detainer proceeding satisfies the requirements of law. (R. 
76-77) First, in Utah the landlord remedy of Unlawful Detainer is strictly construed: 
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"The unlawful detainer statute is a summary proceeding and in derogation of the 
common law. It provides a severe remedy, and this Court has previously held that it 
must be strictly complied with before the cause of action may be maintained." 
Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 P.2d 852, 853 (Utah 1979)(notice to quit defective because did 
not notify tenant that it had the right to pay delinquent rent)(emphasis added); see also Cache 
County v. Beus, 978 P.2d 1043, 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)(landlordfs notice defective 
because contained no expression of "remedy or quit" as the statute requires, but merely noted 
that "no payments were made," and ordered tenant to surrender possession). 
Accordingly, the provisions for unlawful detainer proceedings in Utah must be strictly 
obeyed. 
Second, the plain language of statutes controls. Utah Dept. of Environmental Quality 
v. Wind River Petroleum, 881 P.2d 869, 872-73 (Utah 1994). The Utah Unlawful Detainer 
Statute unambiguously provides that, "[t]he court shall indorse on the summons the number 
of days within which the defendant is required to appear and defend the action" and that 
"[t]he summons shall be changed in form to conform to the time of service as ordered." Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-36-8 (emphasis added). The statute plainly refers to indorsement of the 
summons itself, not to the issuance of a separate order on an ex parte motion. 
Third, a summons is special: it is the document that uniquely compels the defendant 
to respond to the complaint, and since it requires an affirmative response at the risk of 
suffering a default judgment, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the requirements for the 
content of a summons must be strictly followed. See e.g., Dynapac, Inc. v. Innovations, Inc., 
550 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1976)(process server failure to indorse date and time of service 
rendered summons "fatally defective"). 
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Fourth, it is particularly critical that the statutory requirements for shortening time for 
defendants to appear and defend an action should be strictly followed in Unlawful Detainer 
proceedings. The legislature has carefully balanced landlords' and tenants1 rights: 
(1) (Tenants' Side) A landlord can no longer use self-help to remove a tenant. UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-36-12 (2) (Landlords' Side) In exchange, however, landlords have been provided 
with a summary proceeding whereby through the posting of a Possession Bond, landlords 
can quickly recover possession of the premises. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-8.5 (3) (Tenants' 
Side) Tenants can nevertheless post a Renter's Counter-Bond, "trumping" the landlord's 
possession bond, thereby allowing tenants to remain on the property. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
36-8.5 (4) (Landlord's Side) UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-8 allows landlords to shorten the time 
within which tenants must appear and defend the action-or risk default judgment-from the 
ordinary 20-day time to respond, to a mere three days. Failure to require strict compliance 
with the requirements for indorsement of the summons by the court in unlawful detainer 
proceedings would tilt the scales in favor of landlords, destroying the delicate statutory 
balance between landlords' and tenants' rights which the Utah legislature has crafted. If any 
change were needed, it should come from the legislature. 
Landlord Parkside did not comply with the statutory requirements for indorsement and 
changes to the Summons, so the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Tenant Insure-
Rite, Inc., and the judgment and all other rulings below should be reversed. 
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POINT II 
IN GRANTING THE LANDLORDS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FOR POSSESSION AND DAMAGES, THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED BY PROCEEDING WITHOUT PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION OVER THE TENANT, BY DECIDING ISSUES OF 
FACT, AND BY TREBLING DAMAGES 3 
A, The trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Tenant 
As discussed under Point I, the Landlord failed to state a claim for relief because of 
the defective Notice to Quit and, moreover, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over 
the Tenant because the Summons, was not properly indorsed or changed by the court. The 
Tenant repeatedly raised these objections in its Oppositions to the Landlord's motions for 
summary judgment. The trial court therefore erred in granting such motions. 
B. The trial court erroneously decided genuine issues of material fact on summary 
judgment 
Summary judgment is properly granted only when there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. UTAH R.CIV.P. 
3
. The trial court denied the Tenant's Motion to Quash Summons Served on July 
27, 1998 and Motion to Dismiss the action, either of which would have deprived the 
court of jurisdiction as a matter of law. Also, as a matter of law, the trial court is 
precluded from deciding issues of fact. Utah R.Civ.P. Rule 56(c). Moreover, in this case 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10(3) precludes treble damages because the Tenant was not in 
"unlawful detainer". The standard of review for these issues therefore is the "correction of 
error" standard, for which no deference is due the trial court. Ong International (U.S.A.) 
Inc.v. 11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993); Fowler v. Seiter, 838 P.2d 
675, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
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56(c); Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 101 (Utah 1992). Because summary judgment 
deprives the losing party of a trial on the merits, appellate courts view the facts and 
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party. Nymanv. 
McDonald, 966 P.2d 1210, 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
In addition to the express obligations under the lease, the Landlord had an implied 
duty of good faith and fair dealing. Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and 
Livestock Co.. Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1037 (Utah 1985)(duty of good faith and fair dealing 
with respect to option to extend contract for oil and gas rights). The implied term of good 
faith and fair dealing is as much a part of the lease as those terms that are expressed. Coulter 
& Smith, Ltd. v. Russell 966 P.2d 852, 858 (Utah 1998)(option to purchase real estate). 
Whether there has been a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a 
factual issue. The Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 291 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1994)(summary judgment reversed). 
1. Issues of fact improperly decided in summary judgment for possession 
In granting the Landlord's motion for summary judgment for possession, the trial court 
erroneously decided disputed genuine issues of material fact. The trial court below candidly 
acknowledged that there were disputed genuine issues of material fact: 
"I mean, there are very few issues of fact here, obviously." 
(R. 1037, p.2, lines 22-23)(Addendum Exhibit 13Vemphasis added) 
Indeed, there were numerous genuine issues of material fact, both under the express 
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terms of the Option to Extend and under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
including: (1) Did the Landlord's February 10, 1998, response breach the terms of the Option 
to Extend or the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by proposing an entirely new 
lease instead of responding with an appropriately formulated f,new Basic Rent"? (2) Did such 
response breach such duties because it contained annual escalations in rent for each year of 
the three-year extension term, contrary to the Option to Extend, which provided for the "new 
Basic Rent" to be locked in at the "then prevailing market rates" as of the date of the 
extension? (3) Did such response breach such duties by omitting consideration of the lower 
comparable rentals in the Landlord's own Parkside Tower building in determining the new 
Basic Rent, as expressly required by the Option to Extend? (4) Did such response breach 
such duties by demanding that the Tenant pay for all of its own parking spaces, whereas 
under the original Lease, the Tenant received 5 free parking spaces, which had a value of 
approximately $10,000 over the 3-year extension (5) Did such response breach such duties 
by refusing to offer comparable relocation premises in the event of nonrenewal, as required 
by the original lease? (6) Did the Landlord's March 16, 1998 response, submitted thirty-eight 
days after Tenant had exercised the Option to Extend, breach the express terms of the lease 
or the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, since the Option to Extend required the 
Landlord to respond within 30 days to the Tenant's exercise of the Option? (7) Did such 
second response breach such duties by giving the Tenant only four days, until March 20, 
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1998, to respond, not 30 days as required by the Option to Extend? (8) Did such second 
response breach such duties by allocating "weights" to the allegedly comparable rentals, in 
order to arrive at a higher proposed new Basic Rent, contrary to the Option to Extend, which 
contained no provision for "weighting" the comparables? (9) Did such second response 
breach such duties by continuing to insist on annual escalations in rent for each year of the 
three-year extension term, in violation of the express terms of the Option to Extend, which 
provided for the "new Basic Rent" to be locked in at the "then prevailing market rates" as of 
the date of the extension? (10) Did such second response breach such duties by demanding 
an average yearly new Basic Rent of $18.00 per square foot, whereas the rental rate in the 
Landlord's own building, according to Landlord's letter itself, was $17.00 per square foot? 
(11) Did such second response breach such duties by continuing to refuse to offer 
comparable relocation premises in the event of nonrenewal, as required in the original Lease? 
(12) Did the Landlord's conduct breach such duties by implementing a plan to provide the 
Tenant with "an offer you can't accept," in order to evict the Tenant and lease the premises 
to Access Long Distance? (13) Did the Landlord breach such duties by rejecting the Tenant's 
tender of rent at $17.00 per square foot, the average amount charged to other tenants in the 
Landlord's building, compared to the Tenant's original lease rate of $16.15 per square foot? 
The trial court recognized that such issues of fact existed regarding the meaning of 
the Option to Extend when it asked counsel for the Landlord: 
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"Well, tell me before you step down, in that case, what does the language 
Incomparable size, similar terms, similar credit worthy tenant, first by 
reference to the building, second to the other similar buildings in Downtown 
Salt Lake,['] what does that suppose to mean if you can't use it to see whether 
or not the market rate is fair?" [sic] 
(R. 1037, p.3, lines 16-22XAddendum Exhibit 13Xemphasis added) 
Instead of allowing the Tenant a trial on the merits, the trial court proceeded to decide 
these issues on summary judgment: 
"THE COURT:... I'm granting the motion for partial summary judgment. The 
reason is this phrase, sentence, which I think is the key to the whole case and 
the renewal of an option, which is 'Market rate as used by landlord to 
determine the new basic rent shall be the rental rate.' The reason this is not a 
formula which can result in an exact calculation no matter what an appraiser 
says or anybody else — had it specifically identified buildings, specific 
buildings, specific floors, specific configurations or minimum and maximum 
square footage, maybe we could get there. But my ruling is what this does is 
about what [Landlord's counsel] said it does, that is it requires fairness. 
Somebody couldn't - the landlord couldn't have said 30 bucks, the same way 
the tenant couldn't have come back with two bucks. It says there's got to be a 
fair market price. We are talking about a range. There is no question in my 
mind but that $18 falls within the fair range that we are talking about. That 
being the case, it doesn't matter whether the February 10 letter or the March 
16th letter is the notification to the Defendant of the new rate. They both say 
$18 a foot, the first one somewhat ambiguous, the second one not ambiguous 
at all. ..." 
(R. 1040-1041, p. 15, lines 10-25; p. 16, lines 1- L2¥Addendum Exhibit 13yemphasis added) 
Perhaps more than with respect to any other issue of fact, the Landlord and Tenant 
profoundly disagreed about what the "new Basic Rent" for the 3-year extension term should 
be: the Landlord in its February 10, 1998 and March 16, 1998 letters demanded, inter alia, 
$18.00 per square foot, an 11% increase over the original lease rate, whereas the Tenant's 
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expert contended it should be $17.00, a 5% increase. (R. 749) The trial court decided that 
fundamental disputed genuine issue of material fact on summary judgment as well: 
"There is no question in my mind but that $18 falls within the fair range that 
we are talking about." 
(R. 1040-1041, p. 15, lines 10-25; p. 16, lines 1-12YAddendum Exhibit 13¥emphasis added) 
Since there were genuinely disputed issues of material fact, the trial court should have 
denied summary judgment, not proceeded to decide such issues on summary judgment. 
Munford v. Lee Servicing Co.. 999 P.2d 23, 26 n.7, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 108, ^ 14 
(2000)(trial court erroneously decided factual issues on summary judgment which trial court 
recognized as such). Whether the covenant of good faith and fair dealing was breached by 
the Landlord was a quintessential^ factual issue precluding summary judgment. The 
Republic Group. Inc. v. Won-Door Corp.. 883 P.2d 285, 291 (Ut. Ct. App. 1994)(good faith 
a factual issue; summary judgment reversed). 
2. Issues of fact improperly decided in summary judgment for damages 
Similarly, in granting the Landlord's motion for summary judgment for damages, the 
trial court erroneously decided disputed genuine issues of material fact. The Landlord 
contended through affidavits that the fair rental value for purposes of the adjudication of 
damages was $18.00 per square foot per year, (R. 812, ^ [6) whereas the Tenant contended 
through affidavits that the proper value should be premised on the $16.15 per square foot per 
year under the original lease. (R. 923-924) The trial court split the difference, concluding 
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that the fair rental value was $17.00, and awarded the Landlord damages in that amount. (R. 
1185) In doing so the trial court erroneously decided the genuinely disputed issue of material 
fact regarding fair rental value. See Munford v. Lee Servicing Co., 999 P.2d 23, 28, 
2000 Utah Ct. App. 108, If 27 (2000)(trial court erroneously decided which of two versions 
of insurance policy was in effect). 
The trial court was led astray by the Landlord's assertion that there was no disputed 
issue of fact because the Tenant had proposed a "new Basic Rent" of $17.00 per square foot 
per year. (R. 995) The Tenant's submittal of a $17.00 rate, however, was for purposes of the 
"new Basic Rent" for the 3-year term extension (and which the Landlord refused when 
tendered). In contrast, the issue before the trial court at the damages hearing was the "fair 
rental value" to be assessed against a holdover tenant. The Landlord-and the trial court-
confused the question of "rent" with the question of "damages." 
C. The trial court erroneously trebled damages 
Even if there had been no genuine issue of material fact precluding summary 
judgment for damages, the trial court erred in trebling damages as a matter of law. First, and 
as set out in Point I above, the Tenant was not in "unlawful detainer," and that was the only 
possibly applicable ground for trebling damages under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10(3). 
Accordingly, the trial court erred as a matter of law, and its award of treble damages should 
be reversed. 
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Second, even if the Tenant had been in unlawful detainer, the treble damages 
provision in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10(3) violates both the state and federal Due Process 
Clauses. U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, Sec. 1; UTAH CONST, art. I, Sec. 7. When a damages 
award is grossly excessive, in light of (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the conduct, (2) 
the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered and the damages award, and (3) 
the difference between the remedy and other penalties authorized in comparable cases, it no 
longer vindicates the State's legitimate interests in punishment and deterrence and is violative 
of due process. BMW of North America. Inc. v. Gore. 116 S.Ct. 1589, 1595 (1996)(punitive 
damages invalidated). These factors do not support the over $100,000 in damages assessed 
against the Tenant for remaining in premises that otherwise would have been rented to the 
Tenant but for the Landlord's bad faith conduct. (R. 991-996)(raising issue in trial court). 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO STAY 
ENFORCEMENT OF ITS SUMMARY JUDGMENTS, IN ITS GRANT 
OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS TO THE LANDLORD, AND IN 
DISMISSING THE TENANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS AND THIRD-
PARTY COMPLAINT 
A. The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to stay enforcement of its 
summary judgment rulings 4 
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to stay the enforcement of its rulings 
on summary judgment since the case raised serious questions regarding the propriety of the 
Notice to Quit and the Summons. Moreover, the trial court was informed that the Tenant had 
sought appellate review, by right and through petition for interlocutory review. The trial 
court concluded, albeit erroneously, that the parties did not disagree that the Landlord should 
receive $17.00 per square foot per year, and the Tenant had tendered such amount. Under 
these circumstances, the trial court clearly abused its discretion in failing to stay its 
judgments of eviction and damages. 
4
. The standard of judicial review with respect to the trial couif s refusal to stay 
enforcement of its rulings on summary judgment is "abuse of discretion." See UTAH 
R.CIV.P. 62(a); Taylor National Inc. v. Jensen Brothers Construction Co., 641 P.2d 150, 
154 (Utah 1982). 
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B. The trial court erred in granting attorneys fees and costs to the Landlord 
1. Award of attorneys fees and costs was improper because of the invalidity 
of the underlying rulings on summary judgment5 
As set out in Point I above, the Tenant was not in "unlawful detainer" so the Landlord 
was not entitled to evict the Tenant or to impose damages. Since there was no breach by the 
Tenant upon which a recovery by the Landlord of attorneys fees and costs could be based, 
the trial court erred as a matter of law, and its award of attorneys fees and costs should be 
reversed. 
2. Award of attorneys fees and costs was improper because the trial court 
made no findings regarding the reasonableness of such fees and costs6 
A trial court must set out findings demonstrating that its award of attorneys fees and 
costs is reasonable. Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 1996)(fees must be 
reasonable); Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988)(fmdings required). 
The trial court's record must be sufficient to permit appellate review of the appropriateness 
of such awards. Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 156 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) The record 
must show the trial court considered four factors: (1) What legal work was actually 
5
. The Standard of Review with respect to the trial court's award of attorney fees 
and costs is "correctness." No deference is due the trial court. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 936 (Utah 1994) (errors of law). 
6
. The Standard of Review with respect to the trial court's award of attorneys fees 
and costs is "clear abuse of discretion." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 
(Utah 1988)(clear abuse of discretion). 
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performed? (2) How much of the work performed was reasonably necessary to adequately 
prosecute the matter? (3) Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the rates customarily 
charged in the locality for similar services? (4) Are there circumstances which require 
consideration of additional factors, including those listed in the Code of Professional 
Responsibility? Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990-91 (Utah 1988). 
The trial court herein issued three orders awarding attorneys fees and costs to the 
Landlord and its attorneys. (1) On July 19, 1999, the court awarded $33,823.50 (R. 1323-
1324); (2) on February 11, 2000, the court awarded $7,998.00 (R. 1428-1430); and (3) on 
May 18, 2000, the court awarded $7,710.00 (R. 1456-1458). Nowhere in those orders is 
there any indication that the factors required by law were considered or met. Accordingly, 
such awards were unlawful and should be reversed. 
C. The trial court erred in dismissing the Tenant's counterclaims and third-party 
complaint7 
The trial court erred in concluding that its grant of summary judgment for possession 
to the Landlord had a res judicata effect on the Tenant's counterclaims against the Landlord 
as well as on the Tenant's third-party claims against the real estate agent and real estate 
brokerage involved in the transaction. (R. 1368-1369) 
7
. The Standard of Review with respect to the trial court's dismissal of the Tenant's 
counterclaims and third-party complaint is "correctness." No deference is due the trial 
court. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) (errors of law). 
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The Tenant asserted the following counterclaims against the Landlord: Breach of 
Contract, Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith & Fair Dealing, Fraud, Intentional 
Interference With Existing and Prospective Economic Relations, Civil Conspiracy, 
Constructive Eviction, violation of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, and Retaliatory 
Eviction. (R. 612-707) The tenant asserted the following third-party claims against the real 
estate agent and real estate brokerage involved in the transaction: Fraud, Intentional 
Interference With Existing and Prospective Economic Relations, Civil Conspiracy and 
violation of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act. (R. 612-707) The trial court ruled that 
its prior grant of the landlord's motion for summary judgment to evict the tenant precluded 
all these claims. This is contrary to Utah law. 
In Timmv. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Utah 1993) the Utah Supreme Court held 
that a defendant's counterclaims are not precluded by the prior grant of summary judgment 
to a plaintiff, unless such counterclaims were necessary to the ruling on summary judgment. 
As set out in Points I and II above, the trial court erroneously granted the landlord summary 
judgments against the tenant. Thus, the antecedent unlawful summary judgment rulings could 
not support preclusion of the Tenant's counterclaims or third-party complaint. 
Even assuming ex arguendo that the trial court properly granted summary judgment 
for possession to the landlord because the tenant rejected the landlord's proposal for a whole 
new lease, preclusion does not apply. A lease is both a conveyance and a contract, and 
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whereas the parties' privity of estate may be terminated by an eviction, claims arising from 
their contractual obligations remain. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 900 
n.2 (1989). The trial court's eviction of the Tenant, even if lawful, therefore did not preclude 
the Tenant's counterclaims against the Landlord which arose from contract, tort and statutory 
obligations. A fortiori, such eviction of the Tenant could not preclude the Tenant's claims 
against the Third-Party Defendants, with whom the Tenant was never in privity of estate. 
Accordingly, the counterclaims and third-party claims were not "necessary" to the trial 
court's summary judgment ruling evicting the tenant, and the trial court improper^ dismissed 
such claims and third-party complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the final judgment and all antecedent rulings by the trial 
court. Appellees should be taxed with costs on appeal. 
DATED this /,**• day of November 2000. 
^OH^MART^i^^~-T 
Attorney for Appellant-Tentem Insure-Rite, Inc. 
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OFFICE LEASE 
THIS OFFICE LEASE (this "Lease") is made this 18th day of 
February, 1997, between, PARKSIDE SALT LAKE CORPORATION, a 
Delaware corporation ("Landlord"), and, INSURE-RITE, INC., a Utah 
corporation ("Tenant"). 
LEASE OF PREMISES 
Landlord hereby leases to Tenant and Tenant hereby leases 
from Landlord, on the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, 
those premises (the "Premises") set forth in Item 2 of the Basic 
Lease Provisions and shown in the drawing attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B", which Premises are a part of that office building 
(the "Building") identified in Item 1 of the Basic Lease 
Provisions and situated on that certain real property described 
in Exhibit "A" attached hereto (the "Property"), 
BASIC LEASE PROVISIONS 
2. 




Parkside Tower Building 
215 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
The space on the 4th floor, 
suite 450, as shown on 
Exhibit "B". 
Approximately 5,037 square 
feet. 
Approximately 4,342 square 
feet. 




Based on a rate of $16.15 

















May 1, 1997 









AGENCY DISCLOSURE: At the signing of this Lease, the 
listing agent represents Landlord, and the leasing agent 
represents Tenant. Landlord and Tenant each confirm that 
prior to signing this Lease, this agency disclosure was 
acknowledged by both parties. 
( ) Landlord's Initials 
Use of premises: 
(AT Tenant's Initials 
General office purposes, 
Address for Payments 
and Notices: 
Landlord: Payments and Local Notices 
Wallace Associates 
215 S. State, Suite 960 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attention: Steve Koch 
Notices 
American Realty Advisors 
Agent for: 
Parkside Salt Lake Corp. 
700 N. Brand Boulevard, 
Suite 300 
Glendale, California 91205 
Attn: Glenn Girsberger 
Tenant: Notices 
Insure-Rite, Inc. 
215 S. State, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 34111 
Attn: Richard Kasteler 
2 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this 
Lease, consisting of the foregoing provisions and Sections 1 through 28 
of the Additional Lease Provisions which follow, together with Exhibits 
"A11 through "H" incorporated herein by this reference, as of the date 
first above written. 
LANDLORD: 
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE CORPORATION 
By: 
Glenn H. Girsberger, Asset Manager 
C-*jJy>* r^rr^J 
Its: f/2^J^ 
Date: Date: ^ <//<?? 
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ADDITIONAL LEASE PROVISIONS 
SECTION 1 . RENTABLE AREA OF PREMISES 
The Rentable Area of the Premises is provided in Item 2 
of the Basic Lease Provisions. For the purpose of this Lease, 
"Rentable Area" is calculated pursuant to the Standard Method for 
Measuring Floor Area of Office Buildings, ANSI 265.1-1980, 
commonly known as the "BOMA standard." 
SECTION 2. TERM — COMMENCEMENT DATE AND EXPIRATION DATE 
The term of this Lease shall commence on the earlier of 
(a) the date on which the Premises are delivered to Tenant with 
all tenant improvements that are Landlord7s responsibility 
substantially completed as provided in Section 7.3 and Exhibit 
"D", other than punch list items, or (b) the date on which Tenant 
first takes possession of the Premises. Landlord shall cause the 
tenant improvements for which Landlord is responsible to be 
constructed in a good, workmanlike manner and shall endeavor to 
have such tenant improvements substantially completed on or 
before the Scheduled Commencement Date. If Landlord is unable to 
deliver possession of the Premises to Tenant on or before the 
Scheduled Commencement Date, this Lease shall not be void or 
voidable, but rather, shall remain in full force and effect 
except as otherwise provided in this Section 2. Landlord shall 
not be subject to any liability to Tenant for any loss or damage 
resulting from such non-delivery and Tenant's obligations 
hereunder shall not be affected thereby. If Landlord is unable 
to deliver possession of the Premises to Tenant within one (1) 
year after the Scheduled Commencement Date, this Lease shall 
automatically terminate, and Landlord shall not, by reason 
thereof, be subject to any liability except that Landlord shall 
return to Tenant all monies which Landlord has theretofore 
received from Tenant as prepaid rent or as a security deposit, 
without interest; provided, however, Tenant's occupancy of the 
Premises at any time shall conclusively be deemed 'a waiver of 
this provision. The term of this Lease shall, unless this Lease 
is terminated sooner as provided herein, end on the "Expiration 
Date" as provided in Item 6 of the Basic Lease Provisions and 
shall not be extended by any such delay. The date upon which the 
term of this Lease actually commences shall hereafter be referred 
to as the "Commencement Date." The period from the Commencement 
Date through the Expiration Date is the "Lease Term," unless it 
is sooner terminated as provided herein. Within thirty (30) days 
after the Commencement Date, Landlord and Tenant shall execute 
the memorandum attached hereto as Exhibit "C", but failure to do 
so shall not affect Tenant's obligations under this Lease. 
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SECTION 20. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Tenant shall faithfully observe and strictly comply with 
the rules and regulations set forth in Exhibit "E" hereto. Said 
rules and regulations may be deleted, amended or supplemented by 
Landlord from time to time with such other rules and regulations 
as Landlord may reasonably adopt for the safety, care, and 
cleanliness of the Building and the Property and the facilities 
thereof, or the preservation of good order therein. Landlord 
shall not be liable to Tenant for violation by any other tenant 
in the Building of any such rules and regulations, or for breach 
of any covenant or condition in any lease. Landlord has not 
represented and is not hereby representing that all tenants in 
the Building are or shall be bound to any part or all of such 
rules and regulations. 
SECTION 21. SURRENDER OF PREMISES 
Upon the expiration or sooner termination of the term of 
this Lease, Tenant shall surrender the Premises in as good 
condition as when received, reasonable wear and tear excepted, 
broom clean and free of trash and rubbish, and free from all 
tenancies or occupancies by any person. Tenant shall remove all 
trade fixtures, furniture, equipment and other personal property 
installed in the Premises prior to the expiration or earlier 
termination of this Lease. Tenant shall, at its own cost, 
completely repair any and all damage to the Premises and the 
Building resulting from or caused by such removal. If Tenant 
fails to remove such items upon the expiration of this Lease, the 
same shall be deemed abandoned and shall become the property of 
Landlord. Landlord shall not be deemed to have accepted any 
surrender of the Premises to Landlord prior to the end of the 
Lease Term, unless Landlord has agreed and acknowledged, in 
writing, that it has accepted such surrender. 
SECTION 22. HOLDING OVER 
Should Tenant, with or without Landlord's written 
consent, hold over after the expiration of this Lease, Tenant 
shall pay, in advance, monthly rent at the rate of two hundred 
percent (200%) of one month's Basic Annual Rent, plus all 
Additional Rent provided by this Lease. 
SECTION 23. NOTICES 
Any notice required or permitted to be given hereunder 
shall be in writing and shall be deemed effective either upon 
personal delivery, or receipt thereof when deposited in the 
United States mail, registered or certified delivery, return 
receipt requested, addressed to the Tenant at the Premises or to 
Landlord or Tenant at the location stated in Item 12 of the Basic 
Lease Provisions. Either party may specify a different address 
for notice purposes in the manner aforesaid. A copy of all 





1. Capitalized terms used but not defined in this 
Exhibit shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the Office 
Lease (the "Lease") to which this Exhibit is attached. 
2. Subject to the terms and conditions of this Exhibit, 
Landlord shall issue Tenant parking passes (individually, a 
"Pass" and collectively, the "Passes") for the parking facilities 
owned by Landlord in connection with the Building (the 
"Facilities") in such numbers as Tenant may request, up to the 
maximum number of two (2) Passes for reserved parking and ten 
(10) Passes for unreserved parking outstanding to Tenant at any 
given time. Unreserved parking shall be designated as parking in 
the parking garage rather or the surface parking lot both of 
which constitute part of the Facility. Each Pass shall, during 
the time it is in effect, entitle Tenant to park one vehicle in 
the type of parking stall designated in the Pass; provided Passes 
for unreserved parking shall be subject to the availability of 
parking spaces. Tenant acknowledges that in order for Landlord 
to fully utilize the Facilities, and to facilitate the providing 
of parking to clients and visitors of tenants of the Building, 
Landlord will make estimates and predictions as to the numbers of 
Passes for unreserved parking that will be used on each day and 
at any given time, and permit others to use the Facilities based 
upon such estimates and predictions. On occasion, and from time 
to time, unanticipated usage of the Facilities may result in 
parking spaces being unavailable for the holders of Passes for 
unreserved parking. If, however, on a frequent and recurring 
basis, there are no unreserved parking spaces available to the 
holders of Tenant's Passes for unreserved parking, Landlord will, 
at Tenant's written request, make reasonable adjustments to 
Landlord's parking policies and practices in order to limit the 
occurrence of such problems to an occasional basis. 
3. Prior to the first day of each month, Tenant shall' 
pay Landlord the monthly parking fee, which at the commencement 
of this Lease is set at $55.00 per month, per Pass for unreserved 
Passes and $80.00 per month, per Pass for reserved Passes, 
subject to periodic adjustments, for each Pass that will be 
outstanding to Tenant during such month. If such fee is not paid 
when due with respect to any Pass, such Pass shall immediately 
become null and void and Tenant shall promptly return such Pass 
to Landlord. Landlord may, in its discretion, increase such fees 
G-l 
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at any time and from time to time so long as the fees charged for 
the Passes are reasonably competitive with rates being charged at 
the time for similar parking in the general area of the Building. 
Notwithstanding the preceding, five (5) of the above aentiojaed 
unreserved parlcing Passes shall be free of charge» 
4. Tenant's rights under this Exhibit shall terminate 
and Tenant shall promptly return to Landlord all outstanding 
Passes issued to it upon the occurrence of either of the 
following: (i) the last day of the Lease Term; or (ii) any 
default or breach on the part of Tenant under the Lease or this 
Exhibit. 
5. The parking rights granted to Tenant under this 
Exhibit or under the Passes shall be deemed a license only and 
nothing in this Exhibit or the Passes shall be construed as 
granting to or vesting in Tenant any fee, leasehold or other 
interest in the Facilities other than a license which is subject 
to termination as provided in this Exhibit. 
6. Landlord's inability to make parking available at 
any time to holders of the Passes shall not be deemed to be a 
breach or default on the part of Landlord under the Lease or 
under this Exhibit so long as such inability is due to fire, 
flood, earthquake, strikes, riots, blackouts, condemnation and 
other casualties or causes reasonably beyond Landlord's control. 
The abatement of Tenant's obligation to pay parking fees for the 
Passes during any such period for which parking is unavailable 
shall constitute Tenant's sole remedy in the event of such 
unavailability. 
7. Tenant may permit its personnel to use Passes issued 
to Tenant pursuant to this Exhibit, provided Tenant shall 
maintain on file with Landlord at all times a current list of 
each of Tenant's personnel permitted to use a Pass. Only one of 
Tenant's personnel at any given time shall be assigned to a given 
Pass and only that person may use such Pass. Tenant shall be 
fully responsible to Landlord to assure that each of Tenant's 
personnel whom Tenant permits to use a Pass fully complies with 
the terms and conditions of this Exhibit and shall be liable to 
Landlord for any failure of any of Tenant's personnel to so 
comply. Landlord may deal directly with those persons designated 
by Tenant as authorized to use the Passes with regard to such 
matters as the renewal of Passes and the collection of monthly 
parking fees, and no such direct dealings shall relieve Tenant of 
any of its duties or obligation hereunder. 
G-2 
C I ~ ., 
EXHIBIT MH" 
RENEWAL OPTION 
Provided Tenant has not defaulted under this Lease, and that this 
Lease is in full force and effect at the time Tenant exercises 
the option to extend as provided herein, then Tenant shall have 
the option (the "Option to Extend") to extend the term of this 
Lease for an additional period of three (3) years (the "Extension 
Term"), upon the same terms and conditions except Basic Rent 
shall be adjusted to the then prevailing market rates, commencing 
on the day after the Expiration Date of this Lease. The Option 
to Extend must be exercised by written notice delivered by Tenant 
to Landlord at any time prior to March 1, 1998. Thirty days 
after Tenant notifies Landlord it is exercising its option, 
Landlord must provide Tenant with written notice of the new 
rental. "Market rate", as used by Landlord to determine the new 
Basic Rent, shall be the rental rate for comparable space of 
comparable size for a similar term for a similar credit-worthy 
tenant by reference first to the Building and second to the other 
similar buildings in downtown Salt Lake City. Tenant may reject 
the new rental rate for a period of 3 0 days following notice from 
the Landlord, at which time Tenant's exercise of its Option to 
Extend shall be null and void. If Tenant does not notify 
Landlord within 3 0 days of Landlord's notice to Tenant of the new 
rental rate, then Tenant shall automatically be deemed to have 
accepted the market rental rate in the notice. 
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EXHIBIT 2 
A.i i.mirane Ve-if.cat.on Services Campari/ 
MEMORANDUM 
X.WCCtf"U-C*»=* 
TO: XRCOLLEs PERKINS 
VLAFAX 
FROM: G. RICHARD KASTELER 
SUBJECT: EXERCISING LEASING OPTION 
DATE: 02/06/93 
CC: WELDEN DAHMES, CFO 
PLEASE EXCUSE THE DELAY LN SENDING THIS FAX TO YOU. AS PER YOUR 
INSTRUCTIONS INSURE-RITE, LNC. * WOULD LIKE TO EXERCISE OUR OPTION FOR 
THE REMAINING THREE YEARS OF OUR LEASE. WE UNDERSTAND THAT 
FTNALIZATION OF THIS OPTION WILL DEPEND ON THE LEASE RATE THAT WILL 
BE PRESENTED. 
THANK. YOU FOR YOURHELP! 
!15 South 3tate -Suite 401 • Salt Lak? City. Utan 8 4 m M 8 0 1 ) 531-0?31 • Fa.-: (SOU 53! -031! 
EXHIBIT 3 
MWallace Associates 
Property Solutions Worldwide* 
Hand Delivered and Received on February II, 1998 
February 10, 1998 
Mr. Richard Kasteller 
Insure-Rite, Inc. 
215 S. State, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: PARKSIDE TOWER LEASE RENEWAL PROPOSAL 
Dear Richard: 
Pursuant to the Renewal Option in your lease and your notice dated February 6, 1998 to exercise 
said Option, the following is an outline for a lease renewal proposal for your leased Premises 
containing approximately 4,408 usable square feet or 5,037 rentable square feet and located on 
the 4th floor of the building known as Parkside Tower, 215 S. State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
floorplan enclosed. (See Exhibit "A") 




























Landlord to provide up to $3.00 per usable square foot, 
subject to review of plans and specifications, for the 
purpose of improving the Premises. Said allowance 
includes construction management fees, space planning 
and working drawings to be coordinated by Landlord's 
architect, if necessary. 
Tenant shall be granted a total of twelve (12) parking 
stalls in the building parking structure and lot. Out of the 
total parking allotment, ten (10) parking stalls shall be 
unreserved and two (2) parking stalls shall be reserved. 
The cost of the parking stalls in the building parking 
structure and lot shall be at the rate of $55.00 per month, 
per stall, for unreserved stalls and $80.00 per month, per 
stall, for reserved stalls, subject to periodic market 
adjustments. 
Base year to remain the same as in existing lease. 
Tenant acknowledges that the terms and conditions 
contained herein and details of the ensuing negotiations 
will remain confidential between the parties to the lease 
and no proposals, lease drafts, leases or summaries of any 
kind will be distributed, copied, or otherwise transmitted, 
orally or in writing to any other entity or person. 
This lease proposal is a solicitation for an offer and does not constitute and shall not be deemed 
an offer. In accordance herewith, Landlord reserves the right to issue lease proposals with 
respect to the same premises to any number of parties at any one time and from time to time, the 
terms and conditions of each individual lease proposal to be determined, and to differ as deemed 
appropriate, by Landlord at its sole discretion. 
Tenant's execution and delivery of this lease proposal and any further negotiation of a lease, 
including without limitation, Tenant's execution and delivery of a proposed lease agreement, 
shall in no way effect a contract to lease or to enter into a lease or bind Landlord in any way, but 
shall be deemed to be an offer to lease the premises described herein upon the terms and 
conditions described herein or subsequently described in any proposed lease agreement executed 
and delivered by Tenant. Only upon Landlord's execution and delivery of a lease agreement shall 
such offer be deemed accepted and shall a valid and binding lease exist. 
f.O / i 
At any time prior to such execution and delivery of a lease agreement by Landlord, Landlord 
shall be have the right without any recourse by Tenant to: (i) conduct simultaneous negotiations 
with any third party or parties for the leasing of the same premises; (ii) cease lease negotiations 
with Tenant; and (iii) enter into a lease agreement with any third party covering the same 
premises, the terms and conditions of such lease agreement to be as deemed appropriate by 
Landlord at its sole discretion. The terms proposed herein shall be valid through March 9,1998 
by 3:00 pm MST. 
It is understood that Collin Perkins of Grubb & EllisjWallace Associates represents the Landlord 
and the principal parties agree thereto. 
If the preceding offer is acceptable to you, please sign and return an acknowledged copy of this 
proposal so we may begin drafting the lease document. 
Should you have any questions regarding this proposal, please contact me at 579-3270. 
Yours truly, 
Collin Perkins 
Office Services Group 
cc: Gerald Goldman, American Realty Advisors 
ACCEPTED THIS DAY OF 1998. 
BY: 
FOR: 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
COMPARABLE BUILDINGS AND LEASE COMPS 
TENANT EFFECTIVE 
SIZE RATE 
1. City Center I -175 East 400 South 
Tenant: Property Research Group 7,000 sf $19.50/sf 
5 years, March, 1997 
2. 185 S. State 
Tenant: Kinross Gold 3,510 sf $17.50/sf 
3 years, July 1997 
3. Broadway Center -111 East Broadway 
Tenant: Watkiss Dunning & Watkiss 7,134 sf $17.00/sf 
5 years, November, 1997 
Average Effective Rate: S18.00/sf 
EXHIBIT 4 
NICK J. COLESSIDES (# 696) 
JOHN T. GIANNOPOULOS (# 7209) 
Attorneys at Law 
466 South 400 East, # 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325 
Tele: (801) 521-4441 
Fax: (801) 521-4452 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Insure-Rite, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE CORP. 




a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
INSURE-RITE, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
COLLIN PERKINS, an 
individual, and WALLACE 
ASSOCIATES,. 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
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AFFIDAVIT BY 
G. RICHARD KASTELER IN 
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No.: 98 09 06982 
Judge: Stephen L. Henriod 
G. RICHARD KASTELER, first duly sworn upon his oath 
deposes and says: 
1. He is the president and chief executive officer of Insure-
Rite Inc., a Utah Corporation, and the named Defendant hereinabove. 
2. That the statements made herein are made upon affiant fs 
personal knowledge. 
3. That the facts stated hereinbelow are admissible in 
evidence, and that affiant is competent to testify as to all 
matters stated herein. 
4. The negotiations relating to the execution of the Lease, 
and the negotiations relating to Defendant's exercise of its 
Renewal Option were conducted by him or he supervised the same in 
behalf of the Defendant. 
5. He had personal interaction with Collin Perkins and Lori 
Ostlind. 
6. On or about February 18, 1997, Plaintiff as the Landlord, 
and Defendant as the Tenant, entered into a lease agreement (the 
"Lease") for those certain commercial premises known as a suite of 
offices, located at Suite 401, at Plaintiff's office building (the 
"Building"), located at 215 South State Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
7. In accordance with the terms of the Lease, Plaintiff 
Parkside Salt Lake Corporation was the Landlord, and Insure-Rite , 
Inc., was the Tenant. 
C:\WPDOCS\ins\parkside v insurerite lit.12.wpd 2 
00730 
8. The Lease was scheduled to expire on June 30, 1998, unless 
the Lease term was extended for a three year term, in accordance 
with Exhibit "H", page H-l, attached to the complaint. 
9. On or about February 6, 1998, Defendant Insure Rite, Inc., 
complying strictly with the provisions of the document known as the 
"Renewal Option", exercised its Option to Extend the term of the 
Lease. 
10. Within 30 days from the date of the exercise of Tenant's 
Option to Extend, neither the undersigned nor anyone in Defendant's 
behalf received the written notice set forth in line 12 of the 
Renewal Option, which states that "Landlord must provide Tenant 
with written notice of the new rental". 
11. Instead what was received from Landlord was Landlord's 
February proposal. 
12. Affiant discussed with Perkins the February [Lease] 
proposal as made by Plaintiff and its authorized agents Wallace 
Associates, and Collin Perkins, and expressly told Perkins that it 
contained numerous misleading, erroneous, fraudulent, and 
inaccurate information. In his discussions with Perkins affiant 
told Perkins that the February proposal a) miscalculated the per 
dollars square foot calculation of what would constitute "the then 
prevailing market rates" for the Leased Premises; and b) Defendant 
would not agree to waive and rescind Plaintiff's obligation under 
the Lease to provide to Defendant free parking; and c) sought to 
introduce annualized increases in the rents, in the absence of any 
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such requirements under the Lease, a fact which was unacceptable to 
Defendant; and d) provided for an increase in the amounts needed to 
be paid by Defendant annually, on a per square foot basis, by not 
taking into account the "Building" as set forth in the Lease; and 
e) by falsifying other material information related to the Lease, 
and presented all of the above to the Tenant. 
13. Prior to the date of the expiration of Defendant's right 
to notify Plaintiff of its exercise of its Renewal Option, affiant 
was informed that a major tenant in Plaintiff's Building 
("Building") , to-wit: Access Long Distance ("Access") made a demand 
upon the Landlord to obtain the premises now occupied by Defendant. 
14. On or after march 16, 1998, and at many times thereafter, 
Perkins and at times Ostlind informed affiant, that Perkins and the 
Landlord would prefer to have Access occupy and use Defendant's 
Leased Premises to the exclusion of Plaintiff, and would therefore 
require Defendant to move and relocate. 
15. After Perkins was notified that the February Lease 
proposal was not in accordance with the provisions of the Renewal 
Option, Perkins on March 16, 1998, delivered to Defendant's counsel 
Defendant's "Written Notice of the New Rental", the March proposal. 
16. Affiant discussed with Perkins the March proposal, as made 
by Plaintiff and its authorized agents Wallace Associates, and 
Perkins, and expressly told Perkins, that it too contained numerous 
misleading, erroneous, fraudulent, and inaccurate information. 
C:\WPDOCS\ins\parkside v insurerite lit.12.wpd 4 
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17. Affiant in his discussions with Perkins and Ostlind, told 
Perkins and Oslind that the March proposal calculated the Market 
rate for the rents inaccurately by not using the provisions of the 
Lease and the Renewal Option. 
18. Affiant was also told by Perkins that Landlord had 
already leased Defendant's Leased Premises to Access. 
19. At all times relevant herein affiant on numerous 
occasions on behalf of Defendant told Perkins and Ostlind that 
affiant exercised the Extension Term, affiant wished to remain in 
the Leased Premises, and that Defendant would continue to pay the 
monthly rent at $17.00 per sq/ft. 
20. After its exercise of its Option to Extend on February 6, 
1998, and effective as of July 1, 1998, Defendant has made each and 
every monthly payment required to be made by Defendant, under the 
Lease and the Extension Term, in a sum equal to $17.00 per sq/ft, 
for the premises that Defendant occupies. 
DATED this (O day of November, 1998. 
G. Richard Kasteler 
C:\WPD0CS\ins\parkside v insurerite lit.12.wpd 
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The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this 
10th day of November, 1998, the signojr hereof. 
My Commission Expires: flaw/I 
'NOTARW/WBLIC, R e s i d i n g i n 
S a l t iiake County , Utah 
Notary Public J 
NICK J. CCLESSIDE3 1 
468 South 400 East i 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111 ] 
My Commission Excares * 
Ft&naiy 23, 19$9 ] 
State of Utah i 
CERTIFICATE Of SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing, was served via: 
facsimile 
yl hand delivery 
United States mail, postage prepaid, 
IS Jl+l th day of November 1998, to the following: 
MR ROBERT L STOLEBARGER ESQ 
MR GREGGORY J SAVAGE ESQ 
MR MATTHEW N EVANS ESQ 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
111 EAST BROADWAY, SUITE 1100 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
C. \WPDOCS\ms\parkside v insurerite lit.12.wod 
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EXHIBIT 5 
N I C K J . C O L E S S I D E S 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
4 6 6 SOUTH 4 0 0 EAST. SUITE lOO 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 8411 1-3325 
TELEPHONE: 801 521-4441 
FAX. 601 521-4452 
March 5, 1998 
Via fax: 801,359.0904 
Hard copy via mail 
Mr. Collin Perkins * 
Office Services Group 
Wallace Associates 
165 South Main Street Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Insurite Lease 
Suite 401 
Parkside Towers 
Dear Mr. Perkins, 
This will re-confirm tenant's exercise of its option to renew 
and extend the terms of the above referenced Lease for a term 
of three years. 
The "Market rate" should be at $ 17.00 per square foot. 
H 0 P n 1 
EXHIBIT 6 
^^ tsEllis Wallace Associates 
Property Solutions Worldwide* 
March 16, 1998 
Mr. Nick Colessides 
Attorney at Law 
466 S. 400 E., Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: WRITTEN NOTICE OF THE NEW RENTAL 
Dear Mr. Colessides: 
After a thorough review of Insure-Rite's Lease Agreement and in particular Exhibit *\HT 
Renewal Option and considerable discussion with the Landlord and the Landlord's Counsel, the 
following is the Landlord's Written Notice of the New Rental for the Premises containing 
approximately 4,408 usable square feet or 5,037 rentable square feet, located on the 4th floor of 













n o c 5 
Parkside Salt Lake Corporation 
Insure-Rite, Inc. 
3 years (as per Renewal Option) 
July 1, 1998 
Rental Rate/Sq.Ft. Period 
S 17.50 Year 1 
SI 8.00 Year 2 
SI 8.50 Year 3 
Same as per Lease. 
Same as per Lease. 
Confidential: Tenant acknowledges that the terms and conditions 
contained herein and details of the ensuing negotiations 
will remain confidential between the parties to the lease 
and no proposals, lease drafts, leases or summaries of any 
kind will be distributed, copied, or otherwise transmitted, 
orally or in writing to any other entity or person. 
The terms proposed herein shall be valid through March 20,1998 by 5:00 pm MST. 
It is understood that Collin Perkins of Grubb & Ellis|Wallace Associates represents the Landlord 
and that Tenant has retained Nick J. Colessides, Attorney at Law, to represent them and the 
principal parties agree thereto. 
If the preceding offer is acceptable to you, please sign and return an acknowledged copy of this 
Written Notice of the New Rental so we may begin drafting the Lease Amendment. 
Should you have any questions regarding this proposal, please contact me at 579-3270. 
Yours truly, 
cc: Gerald Goldman, American Realty Advisors 
Richard Kastellar, Insure-Rite 























FITZSIMMONS ASSOCIATES, INC. 
ARCHITECTS PLAiVNERS 
— — O A c/3 A\ 
EXHIBIT "B 
COMPARABLE BUILDINGS AND LEASE COMPS 
TENANT 
SIZE RENTAL RATE WEIGHT 
1. Parkside Tower-215 S. State 5,000 sf $17.00 50% 
(In addition to the beginning rental rate, an annual rent escalation of $.50 per square foot or 3% has 
been achieved in 22 of the 24 leases consummated at Parkside Tower over the past 3 years. The only 
exceptions have been one year term leases.) 
2. City Center 1-175 East 400 South-
Tenant: Property Research Group 7,000 sf S19.50/sf 16.67% 
5 years, March, 1997 
3. 185 S. State 
Tenant: Kinross Gold 3,510 sf $17.50/sf 16.67% 
3 years, July 1997 
4. Broadway Center - 111 East Broadway 
Tenant: Watkiss Dunning & Watkiss 7,134 sf $17.00/sf 16.67% 
5 years, November, 1997 
AVERAGE RENTAL RATE: S17.50/sf 100% 
EXHIBIT 7 
NICK J, COLESSIDES 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
4 « e SOUTH +OQ EAST, SUITE :oo 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 3*111-3323 
TELETHON'S: 801 Sgi-<K*<u 
PAX. e^ Ot 32l-<V43 2 
March 25, 1998 
Via fax: 801.359-0904 
Hard copy via mail 
Mr. Collin Perkins 
Office Services Group 
Wallace Associates 
165 South Main Street Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Insurite Lease 
Suite 401 
Parkside Towers 
Dear Mr* Perkins, 
As I explained to you on the telephone the gentleman who will 
be making the decision on the market rates was out of town and 
unavailable* I also told you on the phone that we would be 
responding in due course. I expected to be able to respond to 
you sometime this week. 
Nevertheless, as usual you are deciding unilaterally to 
exercise independent judgment as it relates to the deadlines 
set forth in the Lease (thus to ignore the 30 day notice 
requirement), and you now are giving my client and me notice 
on March 25, 1998, at about 2:00 o'clock p.m., that you have 
decided that mv client's option is null and void until and 
unless we succumb to your demand to respond by 5:00 o»clock on 
th3 sap? <33Y that y<?\i gead your notice. This sir la 
unacceptableff in the future please consult your lawyer before 
you take such precipitous action. 
If your motive or intent is to make it so difficult for my 
client to renew its Lease and to exercise its legal rights and 
the option granted to Tenant by the Lease Agreement, as it is 
set forth therein, i.e.: upon the same terms and conditions as 
per the option granted in tha Lease, so that the net result 
would be that you would be constructively evict my client, and 
to otherwise interfere with my client's economic relations, 
rest assured that it is my client's intent to seek redress in 




Mr. Collin Perkins 
March 25, 1993 
Page two 
Now as to the response which you are demanding. Please be 
advised as follows: 
There is NO question in anyone's mind and I hope not in yours 
that the Tenant has validly exercised its rights pursuant to 
Exhibit H, page H-l of the Lease. 
Notwithstanding the fact that you are not following the Lease 
provisions in terms of the required and necessary notices, my 
reading of that page H-l gives the obligation to Landlord to 
determine "Market Rates" as set forth therein; it does not 
state that you on behalf of the Landlord can use the term 
"prevailing market rates and condifrigngr insteqfl &£ J&a 
required *Markefr Rates*. So that you know the terra "Market 
Rate" does NOT include an annual increase for each of the 
years number 2 and 3 of the exercised option to extend* 
Whatever the "Market Rate" is at the time of the exercise of 
the option to extend, the said rate shall apply for each of 
the remaining years. 
Please read section 28.4 cf the Lease, which appears, at least 
to me, to say that you Mr. Perkins have NOT been elevated to 
the rank of the ultimate arbiter in this matter. 
Incidentally, I doubt it very seriously that a Court would 
sustain your position that if my client takes issue with the 
incorrect and erroneous methodology used by you in 
ascertaining "market rates" that the option granted on page H-l 
would become null and void. If you insist on litigating that 
point please be my guest. 
But again enough said on that subject as well. 
Now as to the "Market Rates you are suggesting* You have 
obviously calculated the_ Market Rate at $ 17.50 per square 
foot using the wrong parameters. The Market Rate to be 
applied is the sum of $ 17,00 per square foot. Do not forget 
that you have represented to me during our last meeting that 
C:\wPD0CS\I\insiicit9 lease.2.upd 
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Kr. Collin Perkins 
March 25, 1998 
Page three 
while my client currently is paying at the rate of $ 16.15 per 
square foot, that you believed that the current market rate 
for the Building vas the sum of $ 17-00 per square foot, and 
especially when you compared the rates with the Broadway 
building rates. The same rate of $ 17.00 per square foot was 
also contained in one of your proposals dated February 26, 
1998, the said rate to be applied for the period of 7/1/98 
through 6/30/99. 
So there is no misunderstanding in anybody's mind and 
especially yours, this is to re-iterate that Tenant has 
exercised its option to extend, and that effective as of July 
1, 1998, and continuously monthly thereafter Tenant shall pay 
as and for basic rents the sum of $ 17,00 per square foot for 
the following 3 6 months, and all other terms, provisions, and 
conditions of the Lease shall be and remain in full force and 
effect* 
The matter now is laid to rest. Incidentally, my client does 
NOT have to sign the insulting and confrontational language 
contained in your various iterations of the "lease offer*, and 
therefore, you should not expect a response other than what I 
am providing you herein. 
Your "Rambo* style of negotiating the extension of the above 
referenced Lease has been exhaustive of any good will I may 
have had for you or the Landlord, Your insolent manner in 
handling this transaction is very difficult to tolerate. You 
have managed to alienate your Tenant. 
PLEASE GOVERN YOURSELVES ACCORDINGLY. 
cc: Insurite, Inc. 
C:\WPOCCS\I\insurite lease.2.wpd 
EXHIBIT 8 
Holme Roberts & Owen LLP 
I 1 April 27, 1998 
VIA TELEFAX AND U.S. MAIL 
Nick J. Colessides, Esq. 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325 
Re: Parkside Salt Lake Corporation—Renewal Option Under Insure-Rite Lease 
Dear Mr. Colessides: 
David //. Little 
hltlcd@hro com 
ittorneys at Law 
til East Broadway 
Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Ulll-5233 
Vel (801)521-5800 
'ax (801) 521-9639 
uww.hro.com 






I have received and reviewed your letter to me dated April 20,1998, and 
am writing to respond to it. 
In your letter, you assert that your client has not rescinded its election to 
extend the term of the lease, yet you continue to take issue with the rental rate 
Parkside has established. Under the terms of the lease, your client must accept the 
market rental rate established by the landlord or rescind its election to extend the 
lease term. Your client cannot have it both ways by asserting that its election to 
extend remains in effect while rejecting the market rental rate established by the 
landlord. Inasmuch as your client has rejected, and repeatedly affirmed its 
rejection of, the market rental rate established by Parkside, Parkside regards your 
client as having rescinded its election to extend the lease term. 
I fail to see how your client's position is supported by your characterization 
of the $18.00 rate referenced in my prior letter as a "new" rental rate or your 
complaint regarding the "arbitrary" deadline my letter established for your client's 
acceptance of the rate. Under the terms of the lease, your client had thirty days to 
react to the rental rate established by the landlord, which your client did by 
rejecting the rate that was so established. The thirty-day period had expired long 
before the date of my letter. My letter merely extended to your client, as a 
courtesy, an additional period in which to accept the extension of its lease term at 
an $18.00 rate. It does not strike me as inappropriate for Parkside to set the 
deadline for your client's acceptance of this courtesy or to establish the terms upon 
which the courtesy is offered. Please note that the $18.00 rate reflects an effort to 
respond to your prior objection to an escalating rate. This rate is the average of 
the rates of $17.50, $18.00 and $18.50 for the first, second and third years, 
respectively, of the extended lease term set forth in Parkside's prior notices. 
#54420 
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Holme Roberts & Owen LLP 
Nick J. Colessides, Esq. 
April 27, 1998 
Page 2 
Your reference to the February 26, 1998 letter from Mr. Perkins to attack 
the $18.00 rate was disingenuous. If you were to calculate the effective rate of that 
proposal, you would find that it is $18.33. Moreover, that letter was in response to 
a request from your client for a proposal for a ten-year lease of different space in 
the building. These differences and others, such as the fact that the ten-year 
proposal did not include free parking, make that proposal irrelevant to the matter at 
hand. 
Your assertion that the five parking spaces provided for under the current 
lease should not be taken into account is not supportable. A market rental rate 
cannot be determined in a vacuum. It is substantially influenced by the specific 
terms of the lease. The level of services provided by the landlord, the desirability 
of the space, the length of the lease term, the credit worthiness of the tenant and 
many other factors affect the rental rate at which a landlord is willing to lease 
space to a tenant. By suggesting that the parking provisions of the lease should be 
ignored, are you also suggesting that Parkside is free to ignore other provisions of 
the lease that may, if ignored, allow Parkside to justify a rate of $19.00, $20.00 or 
higher? 
If your client fails to vacate the premises by June 30, 1998, which is the 
end of the lease term, Parkside will immediately commence summary eviction 
proceedings against your client. In connection with such proceedings, Parkside 
will seek treble damages, as it is entitled to do under the Utah forcible entry and 
detainer statute. Additionally, Parkside reserves the right to pursue any other 








July 9, 1998 
D21085 
THREE DAY NOTICE TO QUIT 
Jnsurg-Rite. Inc. 
215 S. State Street, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that your lease has expired and you must 
surrender the premises located at 215 S. State Street, Suite 450, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(the "Premises") within three (3) days. The Premises are owned by Parkside Salt Lake 
Corporation (the "Owner"). 
WITHIN THREE DAYS after service of this notice upon you, you must vacate 
the Premises and surrender possession of the Premises with keys to the Owner, or his duly 
authorized a^ent. 
-4-^V. 
You are not relieved of liability for any amount currently due by vacating the 
premises. If you fail to vacate the Premises within the three day period, you will be 
unlawfully detaining possession of the Premises. In accordance with the provisions of 
Sections 78-36-1 si s£q., Utah Code Ann., the Owner will commence an action against you 
to evict you from the Premises and you will be liable to the Owner for the rent accrued, plus 
three times the damages arising out of your unlawful detention of the Premises and any 
damages to the Premises, plus court costs, attorneys' fees and any other amounts allowed by 
law. 
Robert L. Stolebarger 
Holme Roberts & Owen^p 
Attorneys for Parkside Salt Lake Corporation 
PATENS ilMF l^W 
#57290 UPON fijcU^d, )Us4 
" INDT C0NSTAB1/E T T T s . L SI P  O TABtf sf /j S. . COUVV. UTAH 
DEPUTY 
00 
CRRTTFTCATF OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be hand-delivered a copy of the 
foregoing THREE DAY NOTICE TO VACATE this 9th day of July, 1998, to the following: 
Insure-Rite, Inc. 
215 S. State Street, Suite 450 





























IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE CORP., a ) 
Utah corporation, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
INSURE-RITE, INC., a Utah ) 
corporation, ) 
Defendant. ) 





COLLIN PERKINS, an ) 
individual, and ) 




BE IT REMEMBERED that 
1999, commencing at the hour of 
Case No. 980906982 
PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(Videotape Proceedings) 
on the 1st day of March, 
10:04 a.m., the above-
entitled matter came on for hearing before the HONORABLE 
STEPHEN L. HENRIOD, sitting as Judge in the above-named 
Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the 
following videotape proceedings were had. 
mw 
ALAN P ilVHTH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84107 * 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff: MATTHEW N. EVANS 
Attorney at Law 
Holme, Roberts & Owen 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
For the Defendant: JOHN GIONOPOLUS 
Attorney at Law 
* * * 
2 
the conclusion of this matter and with that, we believe 
similarly, it would be wise to have all damages determined 
at the conclusion of all matters in this case. That is 
our first point. 
Our second point, Judge, is, last week, and I 
believe it was Thursday or Friday of last week, Insure-
Rite received the following in the mail from Parkside. 
If I may approach? 
THE COURT: Certainly. 
I assume Mr. Evans has a copy? 
MR. GIONOPOLUS: I—I've got one right here for 
him. 
And what it is, Judge, is, it's an invoice for 
rent due to Parkside during the hold-over tenancy and the 
calculation of rent due is pursuant to the hold-over 
clause in the lease, which is Section 22 of the lease, and 
I've included a copy of that, Judge. 
We believe that the proper calculation of 
damages during the hold-over tenancy is in fact the 
calculations that Parkside submitted to Insure-Rite last 
week, which is under the hold-over provision if the lease 
and not under the treble damages provision of Utah's 
unlawful detainer statute. 
The treble damages provision, Judge, pre-
supposes that the landlord and tenant have made no 
9 
2855 E Cottonwood Partway, Ste 560 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84121 
(801)365 6200 
[Statement 215-450-CU IMSURE-RITE, IMC. 
215 SO. STATE ST., #450 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
DATE DESCRIPTION 
7/01/98 HOIOOVER RENT 
7/01/98 ESCALATION 
7/01/98 AFTER MRS 5/15-6/15 
Total Current Charges 





_ £ * * 
14,327.32 
Co»m«t • R & ' S t K ^ ^ SALT LAKE CORPORATION 
$ 14,327.32 
INSURE-RITE INC 
ATTN: RICHARD KASTELER 
215 S STATE, STE. 450 
SALT LAKE COT, UT 84111 
Statement Date: 7/01/98 
Total Due: $ 14,32732 
Keep this portion for your records 
Mr. Stewart—Mr. Kenneth Stewart's affidavit. That's what 
we're seeking here is damages under Mr. Stewart's 
affidavit. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Evans. 
I'm going to grant the motion for summary 
judgment. I think the Kesteller and the Stewart 
affidavits establish a value of not less than $17 and—and 
I acknowledge at the same time that the plaintiff is not 
conceding that the market value is only $17, but for 
purposes of the motions, I understood that there was a 
proposal that that would be acceptable under the 
circumstances. 
I will also award a reasonable attorney's foe 
and expect an attorney fee affidavit that conforms with 
the Code of Judicial Administration that will go to Mr. 
Cionopolus and then to me, with any objection to the 
affidavit. 
And Mr. Evans, you'll prepare an order. 
MR. EVANS: Yes, I will, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. GIONOPOLUS: Thank you, Judge. 
If I may, could I—we would like to ask that you 
would certify the summary judgment ruling as final under 
Rule 54. As you know, we— 
15 
TRANSCRIBERS CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss. 
) 
I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify: 
That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith, 
Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court 
Transcriber of Tape Recorded Court Proceedings; that I 
received an electronically recorded videotape of the 
within matter and under his supervision have transcribed 
the same into typewriting, and the foregoing pages, 
numbered from 1 to 17, inclusive, to the best of my 
ability constitute a full, true and correct transcription, 
except where it is indicated the Videotape Recorded Court 
Proceedings were inaudible. 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or 
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either 
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 15th day of 
July, 2000. 
Transcriber 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this J--'u day 
of J u l y , 2000 . 
(5QPY 
Notary Public 
( S E A L ) 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
ALAM P. SMITH 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE 
MURRAY, UT 84107 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
DEC. 4, 2001 
STATE OF UTAH 
18 
REPORTERS CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape 
Recorded Court Proceedings within and for the State of 
Utah, do certify that I received an electronically 
recorded videotape of the within matter and caused the 
same to be transcribed into typewriting, and that the 
foregoing pages, numbered from 1 to 17, inclusive, to the 
best of my knowledge, constitute a full, true and correct 
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape 
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible, 
I do further certify that I am not counsel, 
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or 
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either 
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit. 
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PARKSIDE SALT LAKE CORPORATION, ) 
) a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
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Insure-Rite, Inc. 
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STATE CF UTAH, COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
-cOo-
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE 




INSURE-RITE, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 98 090 6982 
Judae Stephen L. Henriod 
HEARING 
-oOo-
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 26th day of October, 
1998, the above-entitled matter came on for hearing before 
the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, sitting as Judge m the 
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that 
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1 II MR. EVANS: Your Honor, in addition, we've also 
2 provided Mr. Colessides with a notice of this hearing. Ke 
3 is--he is aware of that, he's here. 
4 THE COURT: Well, and he's filed an objection to 
5 I it, so I can't see hew you could have filed an objection to 
6 I  the motion for summary judgment: if you're not ready :o 
7 respond to it. 
8 MR. COLESSIDES: Well, Your Honor, I--I did--I 
9 filed my objection on the basis of jurisdiction, Your Honor, 
10 and I am not here to respond in terms of the merits, Your 
11 Honor. It does put us in a rather untenable situation, Your 
12 Honor. 
13 THE COURT: I think we can reschedule this in just 
14 a few days. I don't want to cut your client off without 
15 having an opportunity to respond. 
16 MR. COLESSIDES: I appreciate--well, Your Honor, 
17 if--if the Court--Your Honor, if the Court rules that as a 
18 matter of law that the proper--the service is proper--
19 THE COURT: That's already been done. 
20 MR. COLESSIDES: Well, I- -that's--that's what I--I 
21 was going to suggest to the Court, is then I will be able to 
22 file, Your Honor, what I need to file in connection with 
23 this matter. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. 
251 01045 
17 
MR. COLESSIDES: And then they can file, I 
suppose, anotner motion for summary judgment, if they think 
they have one. 
4 || THE COURT: Well, I don't they're gonna need to 
5 || file another one. I think we can rely on the one they've 
6 I  filed. 
MR. COLESSIDES: Okay. 
THE COURT: And I'm going to set this for a 
9 || hearing a: 9:15 on Friday, November the 6th. And I'm sorry 
10 to have wasted anybody's time, but I think Mr. Colessides 
11 has raised enough issues to warrant giving him the extra 
12 time to respond. 
13 So, on the motion for summary judgment, any 
14 objections to, any motions to strike, that will all be heard 
15 9:15, November the 6th, that's a Friday morning. 
16 MR. COLESSIDES: Okay. Your Honor, in view of the 
17 fact that the Court already ruled that the summons has been 
18 properly served and is no longer quashed. 
19 THE COURT: Yes. 
20 MR. COLESSIDES: Then I--obviously, I'm entitled 
21 to file my answer and counterclaim. 
22 THE COURT: Yes, you are. 
2 3 MR. COLESSIDES: I presume that the Court--
24 THE COURT: Yes, but that--that doesn't cut off 






MR. COLESSIDES: Well, okay. 
THE COURT: Good. 
MR. COLESSIDES: Okay. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. COLESSIDES: That's fine. But I'm just saying 
to the Court, Your Honor, maybe the Court, there may not be 
adequate time for them to respond, Your Honor, because if I 
were to file--
THS COURT: To your counterclaim. 
MR. COLESSIDES: I'm sorry? 
THE COURT: Correct. And if you file a legitimate 
counterclaim, then that will survive this hearing because 
this hearing isn't directed toward any counterclaim. It's 
just directed to the complaint that the Plaintiff has filed. 
15 MR. COLESSIDES: I will--okay. I will be filing 
16 two things, Your Honor. Obviously, I will--obviously 
17 objecting to the—to their motion for summary judgment. 
18 THE COURT: Yes. 
19 MR. COLESSIDES: And file any other motions that I 
20 may have, Your Honor, as well. 
21 THE COURT: Well, we'll want to make sure 
2 2 everybody has adequate time to respond to any motions, but 
23 we're setting this hearing for Plaintiff's motion for 





to strike the affidavit, and any other appropriately related 
2 ]| subject matter. 
3 || MR. COLESSIDES: Your Honor, there is another 
4 II deficiency in this proceeding, and we tend to raise that by 
5 motion, as well. We believe, Your Honor, that the notice 
6 that has been provided, the three-day notice that has been 
7 provided is insufficient under the statute. As the Court 
8 fully recognizes, the unlawful detainer action is strictly--
9 it's an acuion which the statute must be strictly construed. 
10 M^ n e notice which has been given to my client, Your Honor, is 
11 not pursuant to the statute. That is one other thing that 
12 we'll be doing by motion, as well. 
13 THE COURT: Okay, and we can hear that on the 6th, 
14 as well. 
15 MR. COLESSIDES: Fine. Thank you, Your Honor." 
16 THE COURT: Here's your docket, Mr. Colessides. 
17 Mr. Evans, your documents. Let me suggest, on the record 
18 now, that based en what I've heard, parties ought to start 
19 considering mitigation of damages right away--
2 0 MR. COLESSIDES: Yes. 
21 THE COURT: --and consider a resolution short of a 
22 Court Order. 
2 3 MR. COLESSIDES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
2 5 
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1 option, he can reject the rental rate for a period of 
2 30 days following notice from the landlord at which 
3 t ime tenant exercises its option to extend shall be 
4 null and void. He had two options, he could either 
5 accept the market rate we gave him or he could go 
6 find new lease space. That was the option. 
7 Now, case law is very clear., and I have 
8 already cited it in the previous hearing, Your Honor, 
9 that you have to comply strictly with the terms of an 
10 option agreement. 
11 THE COURT: I see. 
12 MR. EVANS: Your Honor, what the 
13 Defendants Insure-Rite are trying to do is they are 
14 trying to rewrite the lease. They are trying to say, 
15 "We have an option. We have the right to set the 
16 market rate." 
17 THE COURT: Right. They are not trying 
18 to rewrite it. They are trying to say that the 
19 market rate, the definition there jus t below the 
20 mid-point of that paragraph, is something that can be 
21 calculated specifically. And they calculate it at 
22 S I 7 , and S I 8 was the amount. I mean, there are very 
23 few issues of fact here, obviously. They sent their 
24 fax that said they wanted to exercise the option. 

















P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Okay, Counsel, are we ready 
on the matter of Parkside versus Insure-Rite? 
MR. EVANS: Yes, I am. Your Honor. Matt 
Evans on behalf of the Parkside, a Salt Lake 
corporation. 
THE COURT: Mr. Colessides, are you 
ready? 
MR. COLESSIDES: Yes, Your Honor. I ask 
for the Clerk. Your Honor, to give us a tape of the 
proceedings. -
THE COURT: That 's fine. 
I have read all of the submissions, 
Counsel. I 've read them carefully. It appears to me 
this case, this motion, revolves around whether or 
not an S18 market rate is a term that the Defendants 
had a right to dispute, negotiate or not. 
So, please go ahead, Mr. Evans. 
MR. EVANS Your Honor, along those 
lines, I'll address that direct issue, and we'l l deal 
with that separate forward. The option agreement 
which I 've set forth over here states that - as you 
had mentioned, that the landlord, Parkside, would set 
the market rate. At that point, the tenant under the 















market rate. They said, "We don ' t like S I 8 , " and the 
30 days expired; correct? 
MR. EVANS. Correct. 
THE COURT. Okay. Well, that 's where I 
see it, so if that is where you would like to point 
your argument, I 'd appreciate it. 
MR. EVANS: That's where we would. Your 
Honor, jus t to point out, even if we gave them the 
rate which they are saying they are claiming, they 
could say, "Well, no, the market rate is not that. 
I t ' s something else." The landlord has the right to 
set the market rate. Their remedy is to either -
and I 've already indicated this. Their remedy is 
either to accept it or go find new lease space. 
Thank you. Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, tell me before you step 
down, in that case, what does the language comparable 
size, similar terms, similar credit worthy tenant, 
first by reference to the building, second to the 
other similar buildings in Downtown Salt Lake, what 
does that suppose to mean if you can ' t use it to sec 
whether or not the market rate is fair? 
MR. EVANS. Your Honor, I suppose there 
is a good-faith - something, a good-faith covenant 
written in there, that we 'd make a good-faith effort 
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1 to do that Lnder the lease we did that We made 
2 the good-faith effort We took our building, we took 
3 three other buildings and we said, "Here it is This 
4 is what we have the right to do under the lease You 
5 can't tell us what the rental rate is " I suppose 
6 Mr Colessides could come in here and say, "Listen, 
7 the rental rate is two bucks, and so therefore we'd 
8 exercise their option " 
9 THE COLRT It your client had written 
10 back and said the market rate is S30 a foot, would 
1 i that still have, in these other conditions being the 
12 same, resulted m the option being void at the end of 
13 the 30 days9 
14 MR EVAMS I think under the express -
15 under the express terms, they have a right to reject 
16 it or go find other lease space If they wanted to 
17 out negotiate something saying that they could come 
18 m and that they could, you know, fight with the 
19 landlord -
20 THE COURT No matter what the number is 
21 that the landlord chooses for market rate 
22 MR EVAiNS Your Honor, I think there is j 
23 probably a good faith argument written - or a | 
24 covenant written in there We have to deal in good I 
25 faith And I think the facts, the undisputed facts 
Page 6 
1 as follows, Your Honor If the February 11th 
2 proposal is supposed to be that notice that is 
3 defective for the seven reasons that we mentioned in 
4 our memorandum, Your Honor First of all, in our 
5 leased space, that particular February 11th proposal, 
6 Your Honor, does not include fust and foremost the 
7 the building m question If you notice in our- it 
8 is Exhibit 2, Your Honor I'm sorry. Exhibit 3 m 
9 their letter 
10 THE COURT Letter hand-delivered ~ 
11 dated February 10 and delivered and received on 
12 February (Inaudible) ~ 
13 MR COLESSIDES August 11 That is 
14 correct (Inaudible) 
15 THE COURT (Inaudible) 
16 MR COLESSIDES As you review that, Your 
17 Honor, the last page is an attached exhibit which 
18 contains the comparable buildings and lease comps 
19 THE COURT I don't see anywhere in the 
20 lease where it says they have to tell you what 
21 buildings they are using 
22 MR COLESSIDES Yes, Your Honor, you do 
23 THE COURT Where9 
24 MR COLESSIDES I apologize, Your 
25 Honor Your Honor, right here it says -- may I 
Page 5 
i are, that we did make a good-faith effort We took 
2 three buildings, we took our own building and we made 
3 that good-faith effort So, yeah, there is a 
4 good-faith effort - a good-faith covenant written in 
5 there And we complied with that There is no -1 
6 don't think you can dispute that we didn't comply 
7 with that Obviously, even their rate that they are 
8 setting is close to our rate There is no doubt that 
9 we didn't go out there and try to, in bad faith, try 
10 to kick them out of these premises If they'd 
11 accepted this rate, which is right around where their 
?2 rate is, they would be m the premises There would 
13 be no dispute So we did follow that I would say 
14 that there is a good faith clause m there implied in 
15 all contracts And we did comply with that 
16 THE COLRT Okay Thank you, Mr Evans 
17 Mr Colessides 
18 MR COLESSIDES Your Honor, it is 
i 19 important to note m our case that once we 
20 exercised the option to extend, it was the landlord's 
-1 responsibility to provide us with a written notice of 
22 the new rental 
23 THE COLRT Thev did 
-
4
 MR COLF SSIDFS We respectfully submit, 
-* Your Honor, if the Court would take issue with that 
Page 7 
1 approach9 May I come close7 
2 THE COURT No, right there 
3 MR COLESSrDES Your Honor, you'll 
4 notice on Line 13, Your Honor the definition of 
:> marketplace is stated as follows It ^ays 
0 "Market rate as used by landlord 
7 to determine the new basic rent shall 
8 be the rental rate for comparable 
9 space of comparable size for a similar 
10 term for a similar credit worthy 
11 tenant by reference first to the 
12 building and second to the other 
113 similar buildings in Downtown Salt 
14 Lake City" 
15 THE COURT That's all you are relying 
! 16 on9 That does not say that they have to tell your 
, 17 client what buildings they are using when they are 
18 coming up with the market rate 
19 MR COLESSIDES That is true But they I 
20 do have to rely upon the building, though, that 
121 building which is the building that we are on And 
22 if you notice in their Exhibit, Your Honor, Exhibit \ 
23 which is attached to the February proposal, it does 
24 not have anything as to square foot on that building 
25 of their own 
r























We have submitted various other grounds, 
Your Honor -- let me backtrack one more time, Your 
Honor, and ask the Court to consider the following 
language. The following language is on the --
appears on the fifth line of the renewal option. In 
there it says: 
"That the option to extend the 
term of this lease (that's on the 
fourth line) for an additional period 
of three years (which is called the 
extension of terms) upon the same 
terms and conditions as to ~ except 
as to basic rents which shall be 
adjusted to the then prevailing market 
rate." 
And it is extremely important, Your 
Honor, to differentiate between what prevailing 
market rate is vis-a-vis what Plaintiff wants to have 
the effective rate, and that's extremely important, 
Your Honor. Because their rate as stated both in the 
February exhibit, Your Honor, the February proposal, 
which is a proposal and not in compliance with this 
renewal option. It's merely for a new proposal. 
As a matter of fact, I would like for a 
moment to compare the two exhibits, Your Honor. 
HliAKJNG, 11-13-98 
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1 detainer action based on a right of a tenant who has 
2 exercised its option to renew. That's why it is so 
3 important, Your Honor, that once -- that that option 
4 to renew must be exercised as the Court so 
5 appropriately said in particularly where both 
6 optionor, the Plaintiff, and optionee, the Defendant, 
7 must, in fact, strictly comply with the requirements 
8 of this Exhibit A, the renewal option, Your Honor. 
9 I respectfully submit to the Court, Your 
10 Honor, that the February 11th proposal was not any 
11 more than a proposal for a new lease. It was not a 
12 written notice of renewal rental. What it sought to 
13 do, Your Honor, it sought to take away the parking 
14 space. He said it himself on the second page, and 
15 I'm talking about the February 2nd proposal, Your 
16 Honor. It says in itself: 
17 "This list proposal is a 
18 solicitation for an offer. It does 
19 not constitute and shall not be deemed 
20 an offer." 
21 We are not talking about an offer and 
22 acceptance, Your Honor. All we are saying is we, the 
23 optionee, who have a right to extend - to exercise 
24 our option when, in fact, exercise our option on 
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There was another notice given in March 16th, 1998. 
That one. Your Honor, specifically states exactly 
what it is supposed to be. (Inaudible) Your Honor 
is, in fact, a written notice of the new rental, 
complying exactly with the language, Your Honor, that 
says right here: 
"Landlord must provide the 
tenant with written notice of the new 
rental." 
That's exactly what they did. They did 
that on the 16th, Your Honor. And that is - on the 
16th. That exhibit, Your Honor, specifically - if 
you will look on the last - on an exhibit attached 
to that particular notice, it has the Parkside Tower 
rental, Your Honor, at S17 a square foot. 
Their own exhibit on the notice of March 
16th which takes into account the S17 rate and sets 
forth that the building, if one would look at the 
renewal option again, which is an integral part of 
this lease, sets forth that the rent they want to 
charge us is SI7. That's what it says up here. And 
that's what we are supposed to (Inaudible). And 
that's what we have been paying. 
This issue, Your Honor, is not about an 

























comply strictly with the terms of that option 
agreement, Your Honor, and to give us, in fact - to 
give us a written notice of the new rental. They did 
not do that. And they only have 30 days to do so, 
Your Honor. 
Subsequent to that and after they gave us 
that notice and we said, "We don't agree with it," 
they came back with what they say is a written 
proposal this time, a written notice of the rent. 
And that is 11 days late. Your Honor, because they 
only have 30 days. And the additional fact about 
that March 16th notice, Your Honor, is their leasing 
agent, Mr. Perkins, said, "You only have four days to 
accept that," while the lease renewal option says 
specifically, and I quote from it: 
"Tenant may reject the new rental 
rate for a period of 40 days following 
notice from the landlord in which the 
tenant — at which time tenants 
exercise of its option to extend shall 
be null and void." 
They didn't even give us 30 days. They 
said, "You have got four days to get in and get out." 
You see, we are saying to the Court, Your Honor, that 
this renewal option is what we rely upon. They must 
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l do exactly as we are required to do 
I 2 And m terms of the what the proper 
| 3 amount of rent is, Your Honor, the two things that 
4 are on file that have not been controverted, one is 
5 the affidavit by Mr Catseller (phonetic) which bays 
6 that if they properly exercise the option to extend 
7 That is part of our submissions, Your Honor I don't 
S know if the Court has our submissions, Your Honor 
9 THE COURT I do 
10 MR COLESSIDES And then the second 
11 affidavit is by an expert, Your Honor, in the real 
12 estate industry 
i 13 THE COURT I have read it 
14 MR COLESSIDES Okay Thank you In 
15 any event, those two facts, Your Honor, (Inaudible) 
16 affidavits are uncontroverted before this Court 
17 Therefore, on that basis alone, the motion for 
18 summary judgment must be denied, Your Honor 
19 I will submit it unless the Court has 
20 some other questions of me, Your Honor 
21 THE COURT Thank you, Mr Colessides 
22 MR COLESSIDES Thank you 
23 THE COURT Mr Evans, I think the 
124 Defense raises an interesting point In your 
i25 client's letter dated February 10 on Page 2, which is 
Page 
i what your client purports to be the notification of 
' 2 market rate, when it says, "This lease proposal is a 
I 3 solicitation for an offer and does not constitute and 
I 4 shall not be deemed an offer " Do you have a 
5 response to that> 
| 6 MR FV \NS Yes, Your Honor The 
7 provision says that we will propose a new rental rate 
I S there It doesn't say — I suppose if we had as 
i 9 we did, proposed a rental rate, and Insure-Rite said, 
! 10 "I accept the rental rate," and then we came in here 
! l i and said, "Hey you know, it is not binding," then it 
112 would be a valid argument The point is that we 
113 proposed a rental rate in the letter They, instead 
114 — instead of sa>mg, "Listen, you know, is this an 
| is offer of acceptance,' they said, "We reject it It 
116 is P bucks" 
, '
n
 We had given them notice If you look at 
Is* the terms, we need to give them notice of the rental 
, 19 rate That's what we did We gave them notice of 
2v) the new rental rate Lnder the strict terms of the 
21 option agreement once we gave them the notice, all 
122 they had to do was accept it, boom, option is 
»23 renewed, we wouldn't have this problem 
j - - * I suppose if that different issue is 
2s before the Court, we would - we would have a 
Page 14 I 
1 different ~ trouble dealing with that issue But 
2 that's not the issue The issue is, did we give them 
3 a new rental rate and did they accept it They 
4 didn't 
5 Your Honor, we — I really think we are 
6 splitting hairs here about the option agreement We 
7 gave them a notice of it within the right time, and 
8 they - they said, "We are not going to accept it 
9 We reject it " 
10 Your Honor, with regard to the 
11 affidavits, they were filed two days ago I haven't 
12 had a chance to respond to the affidavits 
13 Before I sit down, are there any other 
14 questions that you have9 
15 THE COURT No 
16 MR EVANS Okay 
17 THE COURT Don't worry about the 
18 affidavits 
19 MR EVANS Okay Your Honor, what we 
20 are trying to do here is simply enforce the strict 
21 terms of an option agreement We are saying to the 
22 other side, "Listen, we made a good-faith effort to 
23 put before you what m good faith is the market 
24 rate It is supported by different buildings If 
125 you accept it, you get your three-year option." 
Page 15 
1 There is nowhere in the lease where they 
| 2 are entitled to come in and say, "No, we think the 
3 market rate is this ' The landlord sets it They 
4 tan either accept it or they can find a new lease 
5 space There is plenty ot new lease space They 
6 didn't do either Once their term expired — we 
| 7 didn't kick them out Once fheir term expired on 
8 June 30th we then filed this unlawtul detainer 
9 claim 
10 THE COLRT rhank you, Mr Evans 
11 I'm granting the motion lor partial 
12 summary judgment The reason is this phrase, 
1 ^ sentence, which I think is the key to the whole case 
14 and the renewal ot an option, which is 'Market rate 
115 as used by landlord to determine the new basic rent 
16 shall be the rental rate " The reason this is not a 
17 formula wnich can result in an exact calculation no 
18 matter what an appraiser says or anybody else - had 
19 it specifically identified buildings specific 
20 buildings, specific floors specific conf gurations j 
21 or minimum and maximum square footage mayre we could 
22 get there But my ruling is what this does is about 
23 what Mr Evan said it does that is it requires 
24 fairness Somebody couldn't -- die landlord couldn't 
2> have said 30 bucks, the same way the tenant Louldn't 
12 
13 














have come back with two bucks. It says there's got 
to be a fair market price. We are talking about a 
range. There is no question in my mind but SI8 falls 
within the fair range that we are talking about. 
That being the case, it doesn't matter whether the 
February 10 letter or the March 16th letter is the 
notification to the Defendant of the new rate. They 
both say S18 a foot, the first one somewhat 
ambiguous, the the second one is not ambiguous at 
all. In neither event did the tenant respond 
accepting the SI8 rate. 30 days after notice, that 
option is gone. 
So there is no lease, the option was not 
properly exercised and the tenant has to vacate the 
premises. 
That's the ruling. Thank you, Counsel. 
MR. EVANS: Your Honor, would you like me 
to prepare an order of the decision? 
THE COURT: Of course. 
MR. EVANS: Thank you. 
MR. COLESSIDES: Your Honor, there is 
another matter before the Court. It is the order of 
the prior ruling upon which - we don't know. I 
checked with the court files, and it was not signed. 
THE COURT: I haven't signed it yet 
MfcAXING, 11-13-98 
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1 MR. EVANS: I want to make sure that in 
2 the first order that it is until further ruling of 
3 the Court, so that it isn't an issue that we can't 
4 (Inaudible) in the future (Inaudible). 
5 THE COURT: No, you can't -
6 MR. EVANS: (Inaudible). 
7 THE COURT: It could be raised in the 
8 future. But as I said at that time, I believe, Judge 
9 Lewis set $25,000 as the amount of the possession 
10 bond. The Defendant had the amount based on her 
11 order, and that is the amount. And that is the same 
12 amount for them to file unless we have another motion 
13 and a hearing and there is a change in that amount 
14 that's based on argument. 
15 MR. EVANS: Hopefully that issue will be 
16 rendered moot by your decision today. 
17 MR. COLESSIDES: Your Honor, in 
18 connection with your decision today, is there any 
19 particular time that the Court is granting my client 
20 to remove himself from these premises? 
21 THE COURT: Forthwith. 
22 MR. COLESSIDES: I am sorry? 
23 THE COURT: Forthwith. No grace period. 
24 I have signed the initial order now. 
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because you filed an objection. I'm denying the 
objection. Your client received the proper summons. 
That is my ruling on that. That was my ruling 
before. 
MR. COLESSIDES: Did the Court sign the 
order? 
THE COURT: I have not yet signed the 
order. In fact, I — I'm not really happy with the 
order. There were some -- there was some language I 
think I didn't agree with. The bond may be moot at 
this point. 
Has a new bond been filed0 
MR. COLESSIDES: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: That bond is deficient. That 
was my ruling then. Although, Mr. Evans, I did rule 
that $25,000 was the appropriate amount until further 
court order. 
MR. COLESSIDES: May we have a right to 
substitute, Your Honor, the order -- the (Inaudible), 
Your Honor, in a cash bond (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Oh, you can, but you are 
still going to have to vacate the premises based on 
the ruling on the motion for summary judgment. 
MR. COLESSIDES. I understand that, Your j 
Honor. 1 understand that. ; 
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Mr. Colessides? 
MR. COLESSIDES: Please. Thank you. 
THE COURT: And I appreciate them. I 
like it when the entire package is there. 1 read 
both sides. It was well put together. 
MR. COLESSIDES: We always try to be 
fair. Your Honor. Thank you. May we ask the Court, 
Your Honor, for a copy of that order that was just 
signed today? 
THE COURT: I assume that a copy has been 
sent to you. You can have a copy of a signed order, 
of course. 
MR. COLESSIDES: Yes (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: For your appeal? 
MR. COLESSIDES: (Inaudible) appeal, Your 
Honor, yes. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Anything else, Mr. Evans? 
MR. EVANS: One minor - well, it is not 
a minor issue. I will plan on preparing an order 
today, obviously, on the unlawful detainer. I'm 
pretty certain that Mr. Colessides will object to 
that as in the other order. I would like it, if 
possible, some time that I can come with - after the 
period of objection to get a signed order from you so 
f ~ Page 20 j 
1 we can execute on it. 
2 THE COURT: Just follow the rule and you 
3 won't have any trouble. Mr. Colessides needs the 
4 time provided in the rule to object to any order. 
5 MR. EVANS: Okay. Thank you, Your 
6 Honor. 
7 THE COURT: All right. 
8 (Hearing adjourned.) 
j 9 
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